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  iiiEXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Special and differential treatment (S&D) provisions introduced in the GATT 
and the WTO in support of strengthened global integration of the developing country 
(DC) and least developed country (LDC) members have come under increasing 
scrutiny and criticism in recent years. One criticism has been that most of the S&D 
provisions are weak in their formulations, i.e., are expressed in the form of best 
endeavour clauses and hence are non-enforceable. The other strand of argument is 
that that in order for the S&D provisions to be effective and enforceable they ought to 
be targeted to countries that are in need of them most and be applied not in general, 
but with discretion, by identifying and targeting select group of developing countries 
that require a particular type of support most. The Ministers in Doha, at the 4th WTO 
Ministerial Conference, therefore agreed that all S&D provisions shall be reviewed 
with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and 
operational. A number of proposals have since been put forward and discussed by 
WTO members. 
Following a comprehensive review of the relevant S&D literature, an 
assessment of a select set of proposals to improve S&D WTO provisions is 
undertaken from the particular perspective of Asian LDCs. The analysis focuses on 12 
Agreement Specific proposals which have been identified as having a high likelihood 
of reaching a decision (belonging to the so-called Category I Proposals). In addition, 
the paper takes a critical look at the five LDC specific proposals on which specific 
decisions were reached during the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting in 
December 2005. In undertaking the assessment of the 17 aforementioned proposals 
the paper compares the original proposals submitted by the various Members with the 
negotiated compromise and examines and analyses the relevance, priorities, concerns 
and the interests of the LDCs of the Asian region in the context of these 17 
Agreement Specific proposals. 
The analysis reveals that a majority of the reviewed proposals has failed to 
fully satisfy the demands of the Asian LDCs. In most cases, there is a high degree of 
divergence between what the original demand of the LDCs had been, as was 
articulated in the original proposals submitted to the WTO, and the wordings of the 
proposals that were finally negotiated. The paper argues that in most cases there is no 
benchmark which could serve as a reference point to compare and monitor whether a 
particular S&D provision is either being faithfully implemented or that it is reaching 
its objective. There is no concrete mechanism to ensure enforcement of the 
provisions. The paper further points out that in most cases a true and faithful 
implementation of the agreed proposals would hinge critically on a substantive inflow 
of technical and financial support from the developed countries and this is hardly 
forthcoming. The paper stresses the need for ensuring coherence and points out 
further that the need for coherence was indeed recognised in the Doha Ministerial 
Decision and that it was subsequently reiterated in the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Decision of the WTO. The paper underscores the need for a meaningful Development 
Package in the WTO that would put faithful implementation of the S&D clauses at 
the heart of the Doha Development Round. 
  ivINTRODUCTION 
 
Special and differential treatment (S&D) provisions in the multilateral trading 
system emerged as a recognition of the specific problems that developing countries 
(DCs) and least developed countries (LDCs) were facing in their effort to integrate 
with global markets for goods, services, capital and labour. WTO Member Countries 
generally tend to agree that most of the LDCs have not been able to benefit fully and 
equitably from a liberalising global trade environment because of their weak 
institutions, inadequate infrastructure, weak bargaining capacity, scarce human 
resources and formidable supply side constraints. On the part of developed countries, 
the offer of S&D was also informed by the fact that if DCs and LDCs fail to integrate 
with the global trading system from a position of strength, it will limit the overall 
benefits in terms of global welfare that could potentially originate from the ongoing 
process of liberalisation and globalisation. The S&D provisions in the various WTO 
Agreements were designed to address these concerns. 
 
In identifying theoretical rationale for granting of temporary S&D to DCs and 
LDCs in terms of both protection of domestic market and also ensuring preferential 
market access as part of WTO agreements, Conconi and Perroni (2004) have argued 
that, under the WTO rules, S&D can be interpreted as a ‘transitional equilibrium 
feature of a self-enforcing international agreement between a developed and a 
developing country, where both transitional and post-transitional policy choices can 
be sustained by each party because of the policy path followed by the other’. So, in a 
way S&D provisions in GATT/WTO reflected a confluence of interests of both DCs 
and LDCs on the one hand, and the Developed Market Economies (DMEs) on the 
other.  
 
At the Doha Ministerial Conference of the WTO, member states in their joint 
declaration on November 14, 2001 (WT/MIN/(01)DEC/1), reaffirmed that S&D 
provisions are an integral part of the WTO agreement. The Ministerial declaration 
stressed that integration of LDCs into the multilateral trading system will require 
meaningful market access, support for diversification of their production and export 
base, and trade-related technical assistance and capacity building. S&D provisions 
were to play a critically important role in achieving these objectives. The Hong Kong 
Ministerial meeting also reiterated this support and reaffirmed that ‘provisions for 
special and differential (S&D) treatment are an integral part of the WTO 
Agreements’.  
 
However, S&D provisions in the WTO have come under increasing criticisms 
in recent years. These criticisms focused on three issues: (a) design and formulation, 
(b) enforceability, and (c) assistance for implementation of S&D clauses. Many of the 
S&D provisions were criticized because of their interpretative ambiguities and 
absence of any binding commitments on the part of the developed countries in 
implementing these provisions that were often articulated through best endeavour 
clauses. It is these concerns that led to the inclusion of paragraph 44 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration which stipulated that, ‘members agreed that all S&D 
provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them 
more precise, effective and operational.’  
 
  1According to UNCTAD, in 2004, LDCs share in world trade (export plus 
import) stood at 0.68 per cent (approximately $13 billion), compared to 3.06 per cent 
in 1954.
1 It is true that the share of the LDCs in global export has increased 
marginally from 0.46 per cent to 0.58 per cent between 1998 and 2003 and that share 
of import has also registered a marginal increase from 0.69 per cent in 1998 to 0.71 
per cent in 2003.
2 In this connection, it is pertinent to remember that the top 5 
exporters among the LDCs in 2003 (Angola, Bangladesh, Yemen, Equatorial Guinea 
and Myanmar) accounted for about 57 per cent of the total exports of the group. This 
process of concentration within the LDC group has been on the rise in the recent past. 
This would mean that the overwhelming majority among the LDCs are being 
marginalised at an accelerated pace. More than half of the LDC population continues 
to live on less than $1 a day, while about 81 per cent live on less than $2 a day. The 
number of people living in extreme poverty in LDCs is likely to increase from 334 
million in 2000 to 471 million in 2015 (UNCTAD 2004). During 1995-2003, LDCs as 
a group continued to experience high negative trade balance; indeed, average trade 
deficit increased by more than 30 per cent in the non-oil, primary commodity 
dependent LDCs. The majority of the LDCs are not able to address the challenges and 
access the potential opportunities emanating from opening up of trade in goods and 
services. The picture is no different when global investment and financial flows are 
considered. It is in the aforesaid context that relevance and role of S&D provisions in 
the WTO need to be reviewed and examined as tools that aspire to address and correct 
the existing vulnerabilities of the LDCs in the multilateral trading system. 
 
In view of the perceived weaknesses in the S&D provisions, developing 
countries and LDCs have been calling for a review of relevant articles with a view to 
making these ‘more precise, effective and operational’ as is mandated by the Doha 
Declaration. This mandate led to the decision taken by consensus, of a review of the 
S&D provisions in the WTO. Since the Doha declaration, LDCs and DCs have 
submitted 88 Agreement specific proposals in the area of S&D accorded under the 
various WTO Agreements. As WTO member countries failed to reach an agreement 
on these between March 2002 and February 2003, the Chairman of the General 
Council, in coordination with the Chairman of the Committee on Trade and 
Development, explored the possibility (in consultations held between mid-March and 
the beginning of April, 2003) of a fresh approach to the work on Agreement specific 
proposals. The approach paper circulated by the Chairman on 8 April 2003 
(JOB(03)/68) was based on two fundamental premises: (i) a prior understanding that 
all the Agreement specific proposals remain on the table and will be addressed; and 
(ii) a recognition that an informal categorisation of the proposals was required for 
these to be addressed in an effective manner.  
 
Accordingly, Chairman of the General Council grouped all S&D proposals 
into three broad categories; Category 1 comprised of 12 proposals
3 as regards which 
Members have come to an agreement in principle; this category also included 26 other 
proposals on which there appears to be greater likelihood of making 
recommendations, or which would have enhanced developmental value of the 
                                                 
1   It should, however, be kept in mind that LDCs, as a distinct sub-strata among the developing 
countries was identified by the UN only in 1971.  
2  Petroleum and petroleum product exports from LDCs estimate 33 per cent of total LDC export to the 
world (for the US market, the share was as high as 63.3 per cent).  
3  These proposals are contained in Annex III of TN/CTD/7. 
  2Agreements.  Category II comprised of 38 proposals; these included 27 proposals 
covering areas in which mandated negotiations are continuing and also 11 other 
proposals the operative part of which are being considered in the respective WTO 
bodies. Category III includes proposals on which there appears to be, as of now, wide 
divergence of views, and as regards which the Chairman felt that progress might not 
be possible without a certain degree of redrafting of the original texts that were 
presented. Following the discussions held prior to the Cancun Ministerial, the 
Chairman of the General Council proposed specific decisions on 24 proposals out of 
which 23 were from category I, and 1 from category II. During the Cancun Ministerial 
Conference 3 more proposals from Category I were added to this list. The LDCs and 
the African Group refused to accept the decision considering that the proposals put 
forward by the chairman did not have much economic value; they preferred to have 
decisions on all S&D proposals placed by them.  
 
The failure of the Cancun Ministerial meant that the progress in terms of 
improving the effectiveness of the S&D clauses suffered a serious setback. However, 
the July 2004 General Council Decision (the July Framework) was able to put the 
discussion back on track. In the Special Session of the GC, Members instructed the 
Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) to ‘expeditiously complete the review 
of all outstanding Agreement specific proposals and report to the General Council 
with clear recommendations for a decision, by July 2005’. During the subsequent 
year, work on S&D continued on the basis of the July Framework Decision and 
within the parameters of paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and 
paragraph 12 of the ‘Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns’. A 
dedicated special session of the CTD was initiated in July 2005 to carry forward the 
issue (especially LDC Agreement-specific proposals). Although the expectation was 
that a consensus could be reached on this, Members were unable to come to an 
agreement on the relevant issues.  
 
It is of crucial importance that members move forward on S&D issues to 
translate their commitment towards addressing the problems faced by DCs and LDCs 
into tangible and meaningful results. There appears to be a consensus among all WTO 
members on this. However, it has been argued by some that the current proposals 
have a number of limitations: Firstly, there is a lack of prioritisation of the proposals 
for the purpose of negotiations; secondly, a number of proposals suffer not only from 
lack of usefulness in the present context, but also suffer from lack of feasibility; and 
thirdly, proposals pertaining to similar areas submitted by different developing and 
least developed countries have varying undertones and suggestions which tend to 
make negotiations with developed countries a rather complex endeavour. Others, 
articulating developed country perspectives, have argued that many S&D provisions 
put considerable burden on developed countries, and in view of this any progress 
would have to be incremental.  
 
Following the July Decision of the WTO there was protracted discussions on 
the relevant issues in the negotiations in Geneva. In light of these discussions, during 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting, members agreed to adopt the decisions contained 
in Annex F of the draft document (WT/MIN(05)/W/3/ Rev.2) which dealt with five 
Agreement specific proposals submitted by the LDCs. However, there was no 
concrete decision as regards the rest of the 88 provisions, though the Hong Kong 
Ministerial reiterated its commitment to address these. Instead, the Ministerial 
  3Decision states: “We renew our determination to fulfil the mandate contained in 
paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and in the Decision adopted by the 
General Council on 1 August 2004, that all S&D provisions be reviewed with a view 
to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational. We 
accordingly instruct the Committee on Trade and Development in Special Session to 
expeditiously complete the review of all the outstanding Agreement specific proposals 
and report to the General Council, with clear recommendations for a decision, by 
December 2006. We are concerned at the lack of progress on the Category II 
proposals that had been referred to other WTO bodies and negotiating groups. We 
instruct these bodies to expeditiously complete the consideration of these proposals 
and report periodically to the General Council, with the objective of ensuring that 
clear recommendations for a decision are made no later than December 2006. We 
also instruct the Special Session to continue to coordinate its efforts with these bodies, 
so as to ensure that this work is completed on time.” 
 
In the context of the above, the objective of the present study is to review 
selected S&D proposals being considered at the WTO from the perspective of the 
LDCs of South Asia, South East Asia and East Asia (Asian LDCs). The study will 
examine twelve Agreement specific proposals belonging to Category I and also the 
five LDC specific proposals which were adopted in the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial. 
These proposals will be critically assessed from the perspective of the Asian LDCs , 
mainly focusing on the relevance of the proposals from the perspective of the Asian 
LDCs  and whether these reflect concerns and interests of these countries. There are 
seven LDCs in the Asian region: Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, 
Lao PDR and Cambodia. Bhutan and Lao-PDR are in the process of accession to the 
WTO, whilst others are already members. To be true, many of the concerns of the 
Asian LDCs are indeed common for all LDCs as a group, although the regional LDCs 
will have their own priorities as far as S&D clauses and the proposals under 
discussion are considered.  
 
Table-1 provides some characteristics of these Asian LDCs. The importance 
of S&D provisions in the WTO for these countries is demonstrated by the fact that the 
degree of openness of most of these countries is quite high which is a testimony to 
their increasing integration with the global economy
4.   
An investigation into the state of current negotiations on the S&D provisions 
is being carried out here with the objective to (a) raise awareness among the LDCs, 
development community and relevant stakeholders in the region about the current 
state of play as regards the discussions and decisions on S&D proposals in the WTO; 
(b) make an assessment about the value of the twelve S&D proposals on which 
consensus has been reached (12 proposals belonging to category I) and examine 
whether the proposals were able to reflect concerns and interests of the LDCs by 
taking LDC submissions to the WTO as reference point; and (c) analyse the five 
Agreement-specific proposals belonging to category I and Category III, on which 
agreement has been reached in Hong Kong.  
 
 
Table 1: Importance of Export Sector in the GDP of Asian LDCs
1 
 
                                                 
4 Degree of openness is defined as share of export and import in GDP. 
















1 LDC with 
seaports 142.0  440  17%  0.36 
Cambodia  LDC with 
seaports  13.3 278 62% 1.16 
Lao, PDR  Land-locked 
LDC 5.68 361  25% 0.63 
Maldives  Small Island 
LDC 0.29 2260 85% 0.84 
Myanmar  LDC with 
seaports 53.22  1174  n/a  n/a 
Nepal  Land-locked 
LDC  24.2 233 17% 0.34 
Asian LDCs 
(weighted 
average)   257.52  513  21% 
 
1. Data refers to 2003. Bangladesh data relates to Year 2005. 
Source: ADB 2003; Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries. 
 
 
Section I reviews the literature as regards S&D to LDCs in the context of 
WTO and the current debates in this regard. Section II of the study analyses the 
outcomes of the 12 Agreement specific proposals on which members have reached an 
agreement in principle, in the WTO. The chapter examines how these agreed 
decisions compare with the proposals submitted and whether these proposals have 
improved particular S&D measures in terms of making these “more precise, effective 
and operational” from the perspective of trade interests of Asian LDCs. Section III 
examines five Agreement specific proposals on which decisions were taken at the 
Hong Kong WTO Ministerial and assesses their worth in terms of addressing the 




    The study is based on secondary sources of information. Relevant literature, 
dealing with analysis of the S&D proposals under consideration in the ongoing 
negotiations, was reviewed from the perspective of LDCs. Agreement specific 
proposals submitted by DCs and LDCs since the Doha Ministerial were analysed, and 
these were compared with the ones for which agreement have been reached, in order 
to assess their real worth from the perspective of the LDCs. An assessment of the 
Hong Kong Decision on S&D proposals was undertaken by making a comparative 
study of the final text and the LDC demands. 
 
    Statistical publications of relevant organisations and trade related databases 
served as major sources of data and information for the study (WTO website, 
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics Online, UNSTAT (COMTRADE), World 
Investment Report, and AMAD). WTO documents and studies on associated issues 
were extensively used. Interest and concerns of Asian LDCs served as the reference 
point for the aforesaid assessment. 
 
  51. LITERATURE  REVIEW 
 
There is an extensive literature dealing with LDC interests in the context of 
the S&D accorded in the various GATT/WTO Agreements. Recent literature on S&D 
has concentrated on two important and interconnected strands in the relevant 
discourse: firstly, modalities to make S&D more effective (focusing on identification 
of eligibility criteria, assessing needs, operationalisation); secondly, an assessment of 
the concrete proposals that are being discussed in the WTO (relevance to demands on 
the ground, value addition, comparison between what was proposed in the 
submissions and what was agreed upon, ways to make the proposals more effective). 
Both these strands of literature have provided important insights and guidance for the 
present study, although the analysis in this paper has focused primarily on the second 
strand.  
 
Keck and Low (2004) explored various forms of S&D and developed 
arguments favouring particular approaches to the design and management of access to 
S&D. The paper reviewed the historical context of S&D in which the relationship of 
developing countries with the multilateral trading system evolved with a view to 
establishing an interface with the current discourse on S&D. The paper distinguishes 
several elements in the arguments which are usually made in support of the S&D. The 
paper argues that concerns about graduation, meaning the definition of which 
countries qualify for special treatment and which do not, have complicated the 
progress that could have been made on this issue. Authors argue that a focus on 
measures rather than country status would contribute to more transparency on this 
issue and obviate some of the difficulties. The authors further think that at the same 
time this would enhance and strengthen the analytical underpinning of the case 
favouring S&D.  
 
Hoekman (2003) discussed several options that could be considered in the 
WTO to respond to the call of trade ministers to make S&D provisions in the WTO 
‘more effective’. One of the issues that the author points out relates to the acceptance 
of the principle that poorer countries should be granted “better than MFN” treatment; 
the other issue which is raised relates to the developmental ‘relevance’ of negotiated 
rules and disciplines. Hoekman emphasised the need for a general recognition that 
S&D and more explicit consideration of the development implications of WTO rules 
benefit all members of the WTO and underpins the need for both developed and 
developing countries to engage constructively in the development of new S&D 
disciplines. It is  argued in the paper that the eligibility for special and differential 
treatment should be restricted to fewer WTO member countries than is currently the 
case under the self declaration approach used to identify developing countries. The 
author stressed that S&D should be accorded in accordance with particular 
‘situations’ that inform the state of the economy in the context of any S&D provision 
(situational analysis). 
 
Some of the literature has examined the proposals in order to assess their 
relevance for DCs and LDCs. Melamed (2003) has analysed all the 88 proposals that 
were submitted by WTO member countries urging for changes in S&D provisions in 
the WTO. Four criteria were applied which concerned (a) policy space for developing 
countries, (b) improved market access, (c) assessment of whether the proposals are 
  6likely to lead to any transfer of resources from developed to developing countries, and 
(d) WTO processes and proposals that have been put forward to address problems 
developing countries faced in such areas as notification requirements and dispute 
settlements. Matthews (2005) examined S&D for DCs as part of WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, and analysed the instruments and exemptions in this respect. The study 
also analyses reasons for DC interests in S&D in the AoA. Some of the authors e.g. 
Sheila Page has classified the proposals and assessed their importance from the 
perspective of the LDCs and developing countries (Page, 2005).
5  
  
Velde et. al. (2004) carried out a stocktaking of likelihood of S&D for the 
ACP countries (African, Caribbean and Pacific), within the framework of the GATS, 
and assessed options for incorporating S&D in services in the Cotonou over and 
above the level in the GATS regulations and modes of supply. Tortora (2003) 
proposed various alternatives for reshaping of S&D in the post-Doha negotiations.  
 
TABLE 2: FOCUS, AND FINDINGS OF MAJOR RELEVANT STUDIES  





Winters, L Alan 
(2003) 
Need for S&D provisions 
in multilateral trading 
system and criteria for 
S&D treatment of 
developing countries.  
 
9  Builds a case favouring the need for granting the 
acceptance of the “better than MFN” treatment to 
poorer members.  
9  Focus on developmental ‘relevance’ of negotiated 
rules and disciplines. Calls for more explicit 
consideration of the development implications of 
WTO rules and underpins the need for both 
developed and developing countries to engage 
constructively in the development of new S&D 
disciplines.  
9  As regards eligibility of special and differential 
treatment the paper argues that S&D treatment 
should be restricted to a more limited set of WTO 
member countries than is currently the case under 
the self declaration approach used to identify 
developing countries. The authors stress that S&D 
treatment should be accorded in accordance with 
particular ‘situations’ that inform the state of the 
economy of a particular member in the context of a 
S&D provision (situational analysis). 
Keck, Alexander 
and Patrick low 
(2004)  
Review of historical 
context of S&D in which 
the relationship of 
developing countries with 
the multilateral trading 
system had evolved with a 
view to establishing an 
interface with the current 
discourse on S&D. 
9  The study explores various forms of S&D 
treatment and develops arguments favouring 
particular approaches to the design and 
management of access to S&D.  
9  The paper distinguishes several elements in 
arguments which are made in support of the S&D. 
The paper argues that concerns about graduation, 
meaning the definition of which countries qualify 
for special treatment and which do not, have 
complicated the progress that could have been 
made on this issue. 
Matthews, Alan 
(2005) 
Focuses on Special and 
Differential Treatment in 
the WTO Agricultural 
9  Examines S&D treatment in the context of WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture, and analyses 
instruments and exemptions in this respect and 
presenting an assessment of DC interests in S&D 
                                                 
5 More on this in section II 
  7Study  Area of Study   Major Findings 
negotiations.  treatment in the AoA.   
Melamed, Claire 
(2003)  
Analysis of proposals for 
changes to Special and 
Differential Treatment at 
the WTO (the 88 
proposals belonging to 
category I, II and III). 
9  The study analyses all the 88 proposals that were 
submitted by WTO member countries with respect 
to changes in S&D provisions in the WTO.  
9  This was done by applying four criteria which 
concerned (a) policy space for developing 
countries, (b) improved market access, (c) 
assessment of whether the proposals are likely to 
lead to any transfer of resources from developed to 
developing countries, and (d) WTO processes and 
proposals that were put forward to address 
problems developing countries faced in such areas 





Analysis of the economics 
of Special and 
Differential Treatment. 
9  The study stresses that under the WTO rules, S&D 
can be interpreted as a ‘transitional equilibrium 
feature of a self-enforcing international agreement 
between a developed and a developing country, 
where both transitional and post-transitional policy 
choices can be sustained by each party because of 
the policy path followed by the other’. 
Priyadarshi, 
Shishir. (2004) 
Evolution of S&D 
treatment in the WTO and 
the developing countries 
and LDCs criteria of 
selection of beneficiary 
members. 
9  The study reviews the evolution of S&D 
provisions in the WTO. The study argues against 
‘situational’ analysis, pointing out the difficulties 
that could emanate from making differentiation 
among the DCs.  





Special and Differential 
treatment in post-Cotonou 
Services Negotiations.  
9  The study carries out a stocktaking of likelihood of 
S&D treatment for the ACP countries (African, 
Caribbean and Pacific), within the framework of 
the GATS negotiations and  
9  Assessed options for incorporating S&D treatment 
in services negotiations in the Cotonou over and 
above the level in the GATS regulations and 
modes of supply. 
Tortora, Manuela 
(2003)  
Effectiveness of the S&D 
treatment and 
development issues in the 
Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations 
9  The study proposes a number of options for 
reshaping the S&D provisions in the context of 
post-Doha negotiations.  
 
Page Sheila et. 
al. (2005) 
Reviews the S&D 
proposals submitted to the 
WTO with a view to 
identify the nature of 
relevance and prioritise 
those from the perspective 
of LDC concerns and 
interests.  
9  The study assesses the S&D proposals and 
identifies which of the proposals concern offensive 
interests of LDCs and which concerns their 
defensive interests.  
9  The study undertakes an assessment about the 
degree of usefulness of the proposals submitted by 
various countries to strengthen S&D provisions 
from LDC perspective.   
Source: Review of studies undertaken by the authors. 
 
 
  8Whether application of S&D should be made on the basis of belongingness to 
a group (DCs and/or LDCs) or on specific need-based test has been a hotly debated 
issue in the WTO. Hoekman’s main argument was that DCs and LDCs have not been 
able to make good use of trade preferences as tools for development. The central idea 
of the approach that was suggested was to establish a set of “core” rules applicable to 
all members (the Most-Favoured Nation principle, transparency, binding tariffs, no 
quotas) as well as an enabling mechanism allowing some countries not to implement 
particular “non-core” disciplines, thus providing them with the necessary policy 
space. Financial support mechanisms would assist in addressing supply-side 
constraints, the impact of preference erosion, possible price increases for net-food 
importing developing countries and the loss of fiscal revenue. Some are interested to 
consider replacing S&D with enhanced development assistance to be free from the 
political implications inherent in negotiated S&D provisions. 
 
Others have argued that eligibility for such an enabling mechanism would be a 
highly politicised issue since it would require differentiation among the DCs 
(Priyadarshi, 2005).  
 
The scope and content of S&D in the WTO has come a long way and changed 
over time. In the beginning, there was no differentiation among GATT members in 
terms of the commitments and obligations. However, during the Uruguay Round 
discussion, approximately 150 S&D related provisions were adopted. As was 
mentioned, as part of the Doha mandate a decision was taken to review the S&D 
provisions in order to make them precise, effective and operational. Many of the 
recent changes in the S&D provisions have also come about thanks to the increasing 
role being played by developing countries in setting the agenda in the WTO. 
 
Some authors argued in favour of a specified set of graduation criteria, like 
those that are implicit in the UN definition of LDCs. However, Low (2004) has 
suggested that it could be very difficult to “transform a historically politicised notion 
such as graduation into a precise policy outcome, especially if this is presented in 
binary terms across the entire legal edifice of the WTO”. In view of lack of any 
agreement on definition of a ‘developing country’
6, it is indeed difficult to envisage a 
clear criteria of graduation.  
 
The mention of the need to address the concerns of 'small economies' without 
creating a sub-category of Members and the more recent S&D component of the 
framework on Trade Facilitation in the July Decision, are examples that demonstrate 
the evolving concept of S&D in the WTO (Priyadarshi, 2005).  The setting up of a 
work programme on small economies is a testimony that all developing countries can 
not be treated alike and that the concerns and interests of DCs may vary quite 
substantively. As some of the other authors have pointed out, this changing perception 
is also evident in the framework on Trade Facilitation, where for the first time the 
level of obligations that developing countries will be expected to undertake, was 
specifically linked to their capacity to do so, and was made contingent upon the 
provision of technical assistance. The reference to cotton producing developing 
countries; preference dependent countries; recently acceded countries etc all point to 
a particular subset of developing countries. 
                                                 
6 This is a self-selection category.  
  9 
Articulating clear cut criteria to take cognisance of the heterogeneity amongst 
developing countries is highly difficult: definition, differentiation and graduation are 
complex issues that have many political and economic ramifications. However, many 
developed countries have mentioned that it would be very difficult for them to accept 
mandatory and binding S&D provisions as long as the beneficiary group (targeted 
group) is not clear and inclusion in the group remains open ended because of self 
selection. Most developing country delegates think that a discussion on these issues 
was not mandated by the Ministers at Doha; many DCs feel that this is also not 
warranted by the experience of providing more meaningful S&D to the only sub-
group of developing countries that exists, the LDCs. Some of the researchers have 
pointed out that notwithstanding the attendant concerns, a number of recent decisions 
taken by WTO Members already reflect an implicit acceptance of the differing needs 
and concerns of developing countries and the need to pinpoint beneficiary group(s). It 
has further been argued that implicit recognition of differentiation among DCs 
mentioned above is far from formal. In cases where the reference is linked to the 
setting up of a work programme, as in the reference to concerns of small economies, it 
comes with the precondition of not creating any further sub-categories of Members.  
None of the changes can be termed institutional, or having a cross-cutting impact.  
They have been largely sectoral, and with limited applicability (Priyadarshi, 2004).   
 
Thus the frustrating experience with implementation of S&D provisions has 
led to two opposing conclusions: one is to stress that rather than addressing a wide 
ranging issues and countries, it is better to concentrate and focus on countries that 
need it most; the other is that the focus should rather be more on faithful 
implementation of the provision.  
 
The apprehension of developing countries with respect to some of the 
proposed approaches is their explicit or implicit emphasis on creation of new country 
groupings. The resistance to this approach is informed by an apprehension that even if 
it is agreed that this would be limited to S&D matters, it may have serious knock on 
implications for the impact on ongoing negotiations. Some developing countries are 
apprehensive that this will ultimately lead to identification of a separate group of 
developing countries. The introduction of terms such as ‘advanced developing 
countries’ or ‘developing countries in a position to do so’ has added to this 
apprehension. These countries think that belonging to a sufficiently advanced sub-
group which are accorded relatively weak S&D is likely to lead to more extensive and 
aggressive demand by negotiating partners.  
 
The recent (December, 2004) initiative by the Chairman of the Special Session 
of the CTD could perhaps provide a compromise in this respect. The Chair’s 
statement recognises the need to provide flexibility to Members in most need of 
special and more differentiated treatment; however, it also makes it clear that no 
developing country shall be ‘a-priori excluded’ from these flexibilities and that this 
approach only applies to new or additional flexibilities, thereby preserving the 
universally accepted eligibility of the existing S&D provisions. This approach has 
many elements of the ‘situational approach’ in providing flexibilities in S&D. 
However, the litmus test should be whether the S&D clauses are being able to help the 
developing countries integrate with the global trading system effectively and from a 
  10position of strength. It is from this perspective that the S&D clauses will need to be 
designed and implemented.  
 
Inspite of the above debate, as regards the need, scope and degree of 
differentiation of S&D, there is a wide consensus about the need for taking focussed 
measures to address the specific difficulties of LDCs in the WTO. Measures in the 
form of S&D particularly geared to LDC interests and concerns are a testimony to 
this. However, there is a debate as regards effectiveness of such measures in 
adequately responding to these needs. The present study makes an assessment of the 
effectiveness of the S&D proposals being considered in the WTO.  Whilst other 
studies have tried to evaluate the S&D proposals under consideration in the WTO 
from the perspective of developing countries and LDCs in general, the present study 
examines a select set of proposals from the particular perspective of the LDCs of this 
region, in the context of their specific concerns and interests and makes an attempt to 
come up with some recommendations to make these proposals more attuned to the 
demands and needs of the LDCs. A distinctive aspect of this particular study is that it 
also makes an assessment of the five LDC-specific proposals as regards which 
consensus was reached in Hong Kong. 
 
2: AGREEMENT SPECIFIC CHANGES IN THE TWELVE S&D PROPOSALS 
BELONGING TO CATEGORY I 
Classification of Proposals  
In all, 88 proposals have been submitted to the WTO to address S&D related 
issues in the various WTO Agreements. As table-3 testifies, these proposals came 
from both individual developing countries (13 proposals) and LDCs (19 proposals), as 
also from the African Group that included both developing countries and LDCs (56 
proposals). Several attempts have been made to categorise these proposals, most 
notably by the former chairman of the General Council Carlos Perez del Castillo and 




TABLE 3: Agreement Specific Proposals Submitted by various stakeholders 






Category I: Agreed in Principle 12  0  5  7   
Category I: Likelihood of reaching 
agreement  4 16  6  
Category I: Total  4  21  13  38 
Category II  7  27  4  38 
Category III  2  8  2  12 
Total: Original 88 Proposals  13  56  19  88 
Source: Adopted from WTO Website 
   
 
  11As was noted earlier, classification by Carlos Perez de Castillo was based on 
the likelihood of reaching an agreement. The 38 proposals belonging to category I 
included those in which there was agreement in principle; another 38 belonging to 
Category-II included those proposals as regards which negotiations were being 
conducted in the WTO; the rest 12 proposals belonged to Category III on which there 
was wide divergence of views and scant prospect of reaching a consensus.  
 
To deal more effectively with the task of arriving at decisions as regards the 
proposals and also to facilitate operationalisation of the S&D provisions, a number of 
scholars including Sheila Page (ODI, 2005) have grouped the aforesaid 88 proposals 
with a view to have a better understanding about the focus of the proposals and the 
interests of the beneficiary countries. Thus, Sheila Page has categorised the proposals 
into ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ ones. Offensive proposals are those which seek to 
achieve greater market access or advocate expanded and secure capacity building and 
technology transfer from developed countries to developing countries (market access 
and aid for trade). Defensive proposals are those which seek either to extend current 
flexibility in S&D provisions or are clarifications or enhancement of existing legal 
texts or procedures (flexibility and clarifications). The advantage of this classification 
is that by grouping the proposals into offensive and defensive categories, it is possible 
to get insights about the thrust of the negotiation process with respect to particular 
proposal. Offensive proposals have the potential ability to push forward an agenda or 
set out a new agenda (within the contours of the current discourse on S&D in the 
WTO) and bring economic gains to developing countries through greater and more 
secure market access. Defensive proposals are useful for increasing necessary 
flexibility or clarifying rules. Table-4 outlines these two broad categories of proposals 
belonging to category I.   
 
TABLE 4: Offensive and  Defensive Proposals Belonging to Category 1 
 
  Offensive Defensive 




Proposals 1–12  
(Agreement in principle)  ---  2, 3, 10  1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11  7, 8, 12 
Proposals 13–38 
(Likelihood of agreement)  19, 33–37  20, 26, 31, 
32 
13-18, 21, 24-25, 
28-30   22-23, 27, 38 
Sub-total   6 7  18  7 
Source: Sheila Page (ODI: 2005). 
Although S&D proposals are sometimes projected as being political 
statements of the relatively poor countries, in truth they do have strong economic 
implications, both for the DCs and LDCs, and also for the developed countries. Page 
(2005) has analysed the proposals according to whether these proposals (a) reaffirmed 
existing rights, (b) consolidated rights, and (c) advanced rights of developing 
countries in the international trading regime. Proposals that reaffirmed rights were 
restatements of current S&D rights and obligations, or called for changes which were 
thought to imply no stronger legal commitment than the current wording suggested. 
Proposals that consolidated rights strengthened obligations for implementation. 
Proposals that advanced rights suggested new rights (including market access or 
access to assistance) or provided new interpretations of old rights. Proposals which 
advanced or consolidated rights (which in turn are expected to be of higher priority to 
DCs and LDCs) were analysed for their desirability from an economic standpoint and 
for their political feasibility. Page graded economic utility and political feasibility as 
  12low, moderate or high following classifications articulated. Table-5 captures the 
essence of Page’s reasoning. 
 





High Moderate  Low 
Economic  Clear Gains 
 
Greater market access, 
reduction of 
implementation burden, 
resource transfer to DCs 
and LDCs  
(Proposal No.: 5, 9, 14, 16, 
28, 69, 7, 45, 68, 33, 36, 
37, 42, 54, 81, 31, 32, 54, 
66, 67, 69, 76, 82) 
Mixed Evidence  
 
Extension of trade related 
investment measures, use 
of agri-subsidies  
(Proposal No: 13, 15, 25, 
41, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 
56, 73, 74, 75, 86, 88, 
43, 60, 63, 2, 10, 83) 
Minimum Expected 
Gains  
 Weak call for 
implementation a 
decrease in 
incentives to move 
away from subsidies 
and investment 
measures  
(Proposal No.: 32, 
71, 77, 84, 8, 23, 38, 
51, 57–59, 62, 78, 
80) 
Political   High Political Feasibility 
 
Lower political or 
economic obligations from 
developed countries; 
already agreed in principle 
under the DDR agendas  
(Proposal No.: 5, 14, 41, 
44, 8, 2, 10, 32) 
Moderate Chance of 
Agreement 
Proposals which are not 
expected to impact on the 
developed counties, but 
may imply high cost for 
individual or groups of 
DCs  
(Proposal No.: 28, 88, 7, 




Proposals that run 
contrary to WTO’s 







to these  
(Proposal No: 9, 13, 
15, 16, 25, 32, 46, 
47, 49, 50, 52, 56, 
69, 71, 73, 74, 75, 
77, 84, 86, 38, 45, 
51, 57–60, 62, 63, 
68, 78, 33, 36, 37, 
80, 81, 31, 54, 76) 
Source: Adapted from Page (2005) 
 
Page’s classification provides a good basis for our subsequent analysis since it 
looks at both economic gains and political feasibility of the various proposals and thus 
helps to assess the value of the proposals from the perspective of the LDCs and 
evaluate the nature of the gains and prospect of reaching consensus on particular 
proposals. 
 
2.1 An Analysis of the 12 proposals on which consensus was reached 
 
  13The 12 proposals belonging to Category I are included in Annex III of 
TN/CTD/7. Members have come to an agreement on these proposals, in principle, and 
there will be no further discussion on those. Among these, four Agreement specific 
proposals relate to GATS, two relate to enabling clause and the rest six relate to 
TRIPS, Rules of Origin, Notification requirement, Settlement of Dispute, Agreement 
on Agriculture and understanding of BOP provisions in GATT 1994 (Table-6). 
 
TABLE 6: CLASSIFICATIONS OF PROPOSALS IN CATEGORY I 
 
Areas of Proposals  Number 
GATS 4 
Enabling Clause  2 
Agreement on Agriculture  1 
Rules of Origin  1 
Dispute Settlement  1 
TRIPS 1 
Rules Relating to Notification Procedures  1 
Understanding on BOP Provisions of GATT 1994  1 
Source: Adopted from WTO Website 
 
 
S&D Proposals Relating to GATS 
 
Importance of S&D Provisions in GATS 
 
As is known, services were included in the GATT negotiation agenda during 
the Uruguay Round. Services related activities has come to occupy an important place 
in the economies of developing countries and also the LDCs; in many LDCs overall 
economic growth is increasingly hinging on the growth of the services sector. Thus, a 
greater market access for exports of services in which LDCs have a comparative 
advantage could enhance the growth prospects of not only the particular services 
sector, but also of the rest of the economy through spill over and linkage effects. At 
the same time it is also equally true that, most of the services sector in the LDCs is at 
an early stage of development, and have weak competitive strength. Their own 
services sectors also need to be provided with protection and safeguards from more 
mature, developed and often subsidised service providers from rich countries. In view 
of services sector acquiring growing importance in their economies, and the emerging 
opportunities in an ever expanding global services sector market, LDCs are in need of 
support from the WTO. Indeed, some of the S&D provisions in GATS do address the 
interests and concerns of the developing countries and LDCs.   
 
 
TABLE 7: Structural Changes in the Shares of Major Sectors in the GDP of Asian LDCs: 
(PERCENT) 1990-2003 
 
Industry    
   Agriculture  All Manufacturing  only  Services 
Country 1990  2003  1990  2003  1990  2003  1990 2003 




Bangladesh   29.4  21  20.9  25.3  12.7  15.2  49.7  53.7  8.05 
Cambodia   55.6  37.2  11.2  26.8  5.2  19.3  33.2  36  8.43 
Lao, PDR  61.2  48.6  14.5  25.9  10  19.2  24.3  25.5  4.94 
Maldives   n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Myanmar   57.3  57.2  10.5  10.5  7.8  7.8  32.2  32.4  0.62 
  14Nepal   50.6  39.2  15.9  20.9  6  7.9  33.5  39.9  19.10 
Asian 
LDCs 
average  33.1 24.4 19.9 24.8 11.7  14.78  46.9  49.8  6.22 
Source: Calculated from ADB, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries. 
 
Importance of the Services Sector for  Asian LDCs 
 
Services were traditionally considered to be non-tradables as it required 
physical proximity of service suppliers and recipients (services are non-storable and 
are produced and consumed simultaneously). However, with the advent of 
information technology and accelerated technological development of the recent past, 
tradability dimension of services has shifted dramatically; this has consequently 
fostered increasing bilateral and multilateral trade exchanges in many services sectors. 
Cross-border trade in services has already emerged as a driving force in world trade. 
Global export of commercial services and their respective share in total exports have 
increased substantively over the past two decades: trade in services now comprises 20 
per cent of global trade (Raihan: 2005). Recent trends show that the growth of 
services trade has consistently surpassed trade in goods during the entire decade of the 
1990s.  
 
For an overwhelming majority of developing countries, services sector at 
present accounts for more than 50 per cent of respective national incomes. As Table-6 
shows, share of services sector in the GDP of LDCs of the region range from 25.5% 
to 53.7%. According to UNCTAD estimates, in 2000 over 50 per cent of FDI flows 
were directed to services sectors, while the corresponding proportion for 
manufacturing sectors was 42 per cent (UNCTAD, 2003). 
 
At present, at least 25 developing countries depend on services exports for 
more than half of their total export earnings. These countries enjoy comparative 
advantage particularly in the areas of exports of manpower since they have a large 
pool of skilled, semiskilled, and less-skilled human resources. Recent estimates, based 
on limited empirical information, suggest that commercial presence (Mode 3) 
accounts for more than half of world trade in services whilst cross-border trade (Mode 
1) accounts for about a fourth; consumption abroad (Mode 2) contributes less than 
one-fifth of world trade in services. On the contrary, contribution of temporary 
movement of natural persons (Mode 4) was found to be insignificant, accounting for 
just over 1 per cent of world services trade. S&D in GATS, particularly in Mode 4 
could thus raise the share of developing countries and the LDCs in the global services 
trade through increased movement of natural persons. A recent study (Winters et al., 
2003) estimates that if only three percent of the OECD labour market is opened for 
temporary migrant workers from DCs and LDCs, this could provide an incremental 
income opportunity to the tune of USD 150 billion for these countries.  
 
Temporary movement of natural persons is especially important for the LDCs 
in the region since in recent years remittance inflows from their migrant labour force 
has been contributing significantly in their economies. For example, in Bangladesh, in 
FY2003, total remittance earning was equivalent to 31.4 percent of total foreign 
exchange earnings from export of goods and services and 46.8 per cent of total export 
earnings from export of goods. As table-8 shows, this is also an important source of 
foreign exchange for Nepal. Some of the other LDCs could reap significant benefits if 
  15effective S&D provisions could be designed which could enhance their supply-side 
capacities.  
 
Thus, in view of an increasing contribution of the services sector in their 
economies, LDCs accord high importance to the S&D provisions in the WTO-GATS. 
The analysis presented below makes an assessment of the proposed changes in the 
original S&D provisions, undertakes a comparison of these changes with the various 
proposals submitted, and assesses the value of the agreed proposals from LDC 
perspective. 
 
TABLE 8: Contribution of goods and Services Sector to Exports from Asian LDCs  

























Bangladesh  4.6  55.4  8.5  68.6  31.4 
100.0          
(10121.9) 
Cambodia  0  88.2  5  93.1  6.9 
100.0          
(1815) 
Lao People's 
Dem. Rep.  na  na  na  100  Na 
100.0          
(378) 
Maldives  67.3  31.9  0.9  100  Na 
100.0          
(113) 
Myanmar  na  na  na  98  2 
100.0          
(2652.1) 
Nepal  8.1  51.7  28.1  87.8  12.2 
100.0          
(945.5) 
Asian LDCs 
average  3.9 48.3  7.6  78.3  21.7 
100.0          
(16025) 




2.1.1 GATS Article IV: 3: Increased participation of Developing Countries 
 
Proposal for Change 
 
GATS Article IV relates to increased participation of developing countries in 
the services negotiations. The text in GATS Article IV:3 mentions about difficulties 
developing countries face in ensuring compliance with specific commitments already 
negotiated. However, the text is weak and does not talk of any concrete commitments 
to address the concerns of developing countries and the LDCs. The proposals 
submitted by the LDC group attempts to strengthen the text by (a) requiring member 
countries to inform how the priority given to LDCs is being met, and (b) making it 
mandatory (using the word ‘shall’) to establish contact points.  
 
Comments from LDC Perspective 
The text uses the language “shall”, which alludes to binding nature of 
obligations under the modalities. However, without commensurate Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) provisions, the “shall” provision may also prove to be without 
  16any teeth. For the first time that in the text on modalities “serious difficulties” of 
LDCs in undertaking special commitments have been given due recognition; in 
addition, lack of institutional and human capacities in the LDCs, to analyse and 
respond to offers and requests, have also been recognised as a major problem 
confronting these countries.  
 
LDCs had originally proposed inclusion of the following sentences in the 
Paragraph: “In sectors of their export interest multilaterally agreed criteria for giving 
priority to the LDC members shall be established”. The LDC proposal attempted to 
incorporate a defensive criteria for giving priority to LDCs interests; however, the 
revised proposal calls for only information regarding implementation. Thus, the 
revised proposal appears to be taking obligations in the area of transparency only. The 
text also fails to come up with any modality that identifies sectors of special interests 
to the LDCs. LDCs will only be able to monitor whether or not they are being given 
special priority in the services sector by developed countries. There is no definitive 
obligation for giving special priority to sectors of interest to LDCs. Though LDCs 
have identified a number of sectors of their export interest, in the context of current 
negotiations, including temporary movement of natural persons (mode 4), the revised 
S&D proposal ignores this demand. For Asian LDCs, a definitive commitment to 
open up labour market under Mode-4 would have resulted in a significant 
improvement in their market access for services. However, the proposals do not allude 
to any such commitment. 
 
2.1.2. GATS Article IV: Increased Participation of LDCs  
 
Proposal for Change 
GATS article IV mentions about strengthening of participation of developing 
country members through enhancement of developing countries’ domestic capacity. 
The article also calls for establishing contact points by the developed countries to 
facilitate access of service suppliers from developing country members of the WTO. 
Moreover, special priority of LDCs for implementing the provision of this article has 
also been recognised. The modified text provides special priority to LDCs for broad-
based and separate round of negotiations in services.   
 
Comments from LDC Perspective 
 
This proposal is merely a commitment to draw up modalities for ensuring 
participation of LDCs in services negotiations. It does not commit opening up of 
sectors of interest to the LDCs. It is unclear exactly what this proposal will achieve 
beyond enabling LDCs to express their interests and priorities regarding services by 
being present at the negotiating table. Besides, without adequate support for building 
up negotiations to produce skilled negotiators, which the LDCs at present seriously 
lack, such ‘requirements’ will hardly produce any tangible results. This clause should 
have been strengthened by explicit mention of the fact that the LDCs and developing 
countries require access to the services market of the developed countries, and their 
distribution channels and information network, as was emphasised in the proposal 
submitted by the African group. The need for flexibility and technical assistance from 
developed countries with a view to strengthening the service capacity, efficiency and 
competitiveness of the developing countries, particularly of LDCs, should have been 
explicitly recognised. The proposal submitted by the LDCs asked for establishing 
  17appropriate criteria for giving priority to the export interests of the LDCs in 
implementing Article IV of services. The revised text does not address this demand. 
There is no firm modality as to how the requirement of effective application of access 
to technology provision of Article IV will be implemented on the ground.  
 
2.1.3. GATS Article XXV.2: Addressing supply-side and infrastructural constraints 
 
Proposal for Change 
This article relates to strengthening of the supply side capacities of the LDCs 
and developing countries through technical assistance. The S&D clause in Article 
XXV.2 which refers to TA support to LDCs was strengthened through the revised 
text. The original text mentions about TA provision at the multilateral level to be 
delivered by the secretariat. The modified text (which was in line with the proposal 
submitted by the African group) includes five new sentences where WTO Secretariat 
is instructed by GC to conclude arrangement with other institutions for the purpose of 
TA to developing countries and LDCs to address supply-side and infrastructural 
constraints.   
 
 
Comments from LDC Perspective 
 
Assistance to address supply-side constraints is mandated to be discussed in 
sessions of the “Sub-committee on the Least Developed Countries”. A recent WTO 
document (WT/COMTD/LDC/W/33) has noted that supply-side constraints went 
beyond the mandate of the WTO; however, the WTO has tried to respond to it 
through a number of cooperation arrangements with other institutions including 
through initiatives such as the Joint Integrated Trade Assistance Programme (JITAP) 
and Integrated Framework (IF). At the 38
th session, the secretariat was requested to 
provide more specific data on the implementation of JITAP and IF. It is generally 
agreed that there is a need for significant enhancement of resource allocation under 
the IF initiative and other Trade Related Capacity Building (TRCB) initiatives in 
order to strengthen supply-side capacities of the LDCs and to build their technological 
and physical infrastructure. The present agreement recognises the supply-side and 
infrastructural constraints faced by the LDCs in the services area; however, the text is 
weak in the sense that there is no concrete ambition which could serve as a reference 
point as to whether any such measures have actually been undertaken.  
 
Although, the need for addressing LDCs supply-side and infrastructural 
constraints and their developmental needs in the services sector is an important 
recognition, LDCs have been frustrated because of lack of resources to address those 
concerns. The need for such support was also reemphasised by the Dhaka 
International Civil Society Forum: which stated that “capacity building support and 
TA should not be only for training, but also for physical capacity building” (LDC 
Forum Declaration, October 2005). Although WTO is not a development agency, 
LDCs expect WTO to play a key role in ensuring that other agencies follow-up on 
WTO decisions. In view of this, the issue of coherence is getting increasing 
prominence from LDCs perspective.  
 
2.1.4. GATS - Paragraph 6 of the Annex on Telecommunications  
 
  18Relevance of the Issue for the LDCs 
 
In view of the increasing importance of networking both within country and with the 
outside world, telecommunication sector has emerged as a major driver of economic 
development of the developing countries and the LDCs. However, teledensity and 
internet use continues to remain low in most of the LDCs, including the Asian LDCs. 
This is evidenced by Table-9. As a result, LDCs have a heightened interest to develop 
their telecommunication sector at a faster pace. They look at the sector as not only an 
important stimulant to ensure higher growth of the domestic economy, but also as an 
important conduit to access global market for various sectors with high potential such 
as data entry, voice mail and others.  In view of this, this S&D clause which relate to 




TABLE 9:  Availably of Telephone and Internet Services in Selected Asian LDCs 
Telephone Mainline 
(per 1,000 people) 
Internet Users 
(per 1,000 people) 
Country 
  
   1990 2003  1990  2003 
Bangladesh 2  5  0  2 
Cambodia (.)  3  0  2 
Lao PDR  2  12  0  3 
Nepal 3  16  0  .. 
Maldives 29  ..  0  .. 
Myanmar 2  7  0  1 
Source: Human Development Report 2005. 
Paragraph 6 of the Annex on Telecommunications relates to (a) endorsement 
and encouragement to participate more actively in various networks, organisations 
and development programmes, (b) asks members to support more cooperation among 
developing countries, (c) stimulate relevant information supply to developing 
countries, and (d) assist in transfer of technology to these countries. However, in its 
original form, the provision is merely a commitment to provide assistance to the 
development of telecommunication service sector of the developing countries and the 
LDCs.  
 
Proposal for Change 
 
The proposed change is in the form of an additional text that attempts to 
strengthen the S&D clause as regards support by the developed countries to 
developing countries and the LDCs in the four areas mentioned in the text. The 
additional text is as follows: 
 
“The General Council instructs the Council for Trade in Services to put in 
place arrangements for prompt notification of any measures taken with regard to the 
implementation of subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 6 of the Annex on 
Telecommunications.” 
  
Comments from LDC Perspective 
 
The revised proposal basically incorporates the suggestions made by the LDCs 
with regard to this S&D provision. The LDC Group submitted the following proposal 
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for Trade in Services of any measures they have taken with regard to implementation 
of subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) under this paragraph”. This additional text was 
submitted by the LDCs in view of lack of any real initiative on the part of developed 
countries to strengthen the telecommunication sector of the LDCs. The proposal is 
intended to allow WTO members to monitor to what extent developed countries are 
complying with the spirit and content of the Annex in relation to cooperation, 
information, and transfer of technology and training in telecommunications areas in 
support of LDCs. As was mentioned, availability of telephone and telecommunication 
services is very low in the region and any tangible capacity building support could 
help the LDCs in these ways: (a) strengthen their domestic telecommunication sector 
leading to higher teledensity and connectivity with resultant positive economic 
externalities; (b) help LDC telecommunication sector to withstand competition from 
foreign suppliers whose presence is becoming increasingly prominent, both under 
domestic reforms in LDCs and under GATS negotiations (e.g. Bangladesh has agreed 
to open up telecommunication sector as part of ‘offer’ under the ongoing GATS 
negotiations and (c) strong telecommunication sector would help the LDCs to access 
global services and ICT market. However, it needs to be recognised that the text only 
calls for ‘prompt notification of measures’. It does not talk of what happens if no such 
measures are taken by the developed countries; neither does it have any goal posts to 
compare. As such the proposal is only a ‘best endeavour’ addition.  
 
2.1.5. TRIPS Article 67: Reviewing Agreement between WIPO & WTO 
 
Relevance of the Issue for the LDCs 
 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, member states are obliged to reflect in their 
national schedules and laws internationally agreed norms for protecting patents, 
trademarks, industrial design, trade secrets, integrated circuits and geographical 
indicators. However, developing countries in general, and LDCs in particular, face 
formidable difficulties in ensuring the compliance in this regard. Appropriate 
technical and financial support could assist LDCs to surmount at least some of these 
difficulties.  Article 67 addresses these concerns and calls for technical assistance 
from the developed countries. However, the TRIPS agreement does not have any 
operational modality to implement these provisions. The Asian LDCs do not have 
appropriate TRIPS laws in place and ensuring compliance with the various TRIPS 
provisions would be difficult. LDCs thus have an interest in putting in place concrete 
efforts aimed at establishing appropriate modalities to assist the LDCs and making 
such measures obligatory on the part of the developed countries. LDC interest in this 
context relate to three areas: (a) in the design of appropriate law; (b) TAs to enhance 
compliance capacity and (c) getting flexible treatment. This particular S&D proposal, 
dealing with TA support to the LDCs, is thus of importance to the LDCs. 
 
Proposal for Change 
 
TRIPS article 67 refers to the technical and financial assistance (cooperation) 
in favour of developing countries and LDCs. Cooperation was to be in the form of 
preparation and enforcement of IP laws and establishment of the required 
infrastructure in this regard. LDCs proposals submitted in this respect focused on 
concretisation of provisions of support articulated in the original text. The LDC 
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improvement in legal framework, enhancement of enforcement mechanism, support 
for strengthening of coordination between IPRs, investment and competition 
authorities.        
 
Comments from LDC perspective 
 
The proposed text is in the form of an additional text. The inclusion in the first 
Para relates to enhancing enforcement mechanisms, increasing training of personnel, 
encourage and monitor technology transfer, making use of the rights and policy 
flexibility, and strengthening/establishing coordination between IPRs, investment and 
competition authorities. The second Para is an additional text where a review of the 
agreement between WIPO & WTO was asked for. It incorporates a number of 
suggestions put forward in the submissions made by the LDC group (rights and policy 
flexibility, strengthening coordination, change of laws/procedures). The first 
paragraph is more or less repetition of Article 67 of TRIPS. The second paragraph 
calls for the review of the state of implementation of the agreement between WIPO 
and WTO with a view to identifying opportunities for TA for the LDCs. From a 
practical point of view, this is a ‘best endeavour’ clause. Whilst an appropriately 
designed TA would be helpful to the LDCs, much will depend on what such a review 
will come up with, and whether the recommendations of the review (were there to be 
one) were faithfully implemented.     
 
2.1.6. Enabling Clause 
 
Relevance of the Issue for the LDCs 
 
The Enabling Clause, officially called the “Decision on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries”, 
was adopted under GATT in 1979. The clause, as is known, enables developed 
members to give differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries.  
 
The Enabling Clause is the WTO legal basis for the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSPs). As is known, under the GSP, developed countries offer non-
reciprocal preferential treatment (such as zero or low duties on imports, in certain 
instances also quota-free treatment) to products originating in developing countries 
and LDCs. Preference-giving countries unilaterally determine which countries and 
which products are included in their schemes. The Enabling Clause is also the legal 
basis for regional arrangements among developing countries and for the Global 
System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) under which developing countries exchange 
trade concessions among themselves. The importance of this provision lies in the fact 
that almost all of the Asian LDCs, enjoy preferential market access under the various 
GSP schemes operated by the developed countries. For example, Bangladesh is a 
beneficiary of 17 GSP schemes, including the ones run by the EU (EU-EBA), Canada, 
Japan, USA and Australia. A large part of their exports enters the developed countries 
market under the GSPs. 
 
Proposal for Change 
 
  21‘Enabling clause’ created a permanent legal basis for preferential treatment, 
which allows differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller 
participation of developing countries. This clause thus allows a deviation from the 
MFN principle. Preferential market access for developing countries to developed 
countries on a non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory basis, were introduced through 
this clause. The entire enabling clause constitutes of nine paragraphs. The proposed 
change is in the form of an additional text. This additional text relates to the overall 
proposition in the enabling clause whereby the clause is made mandatory subject to 
actions taken by the members.    
 
Comments from LDC Perspective 
 
The additional text is as follow: “The General Council confirms that the terms 
and conditions of the Enabling Clause shall apply when action is taken by Members 
under the provisions of this Clause.” LDCs have strong interest in making the GSP 
scheme predictable and LDC-friendly. Whilst this proposal does not change the status 
quo, it could provide increased certainty to GSP schemes, regional trade agreements 
and other initiatives to foster South-South cooperation. Theoretically, an assurance to 
the effect that such measures will not be challenged, could encourage developing 
countries, and more advanced economies to extend preferential treatment to LDCs 
and other low income countries on bilateral or multilateral basis. Thus, the additional 
text provides predictability to initiatives aimed at providing additional market access. 
It is not clear whether the current practice of some countries to exclude particular 
LDCs being excluded from the GSP scheme or similar initiatives is WTO-compatible 
or not. For example, AP-LDCs are not included in the AGOA or CBI initiative of the 
USA. This exclusion has seriously undermined export competitiveness of Asian 
LDCs in the US market. On the other hand, this proposal may become irrelevant in 
view of the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Decision (Annex- F) pertaining to the DF-
QF initiative.  
 
2.1.7.  Rules Relating to Notification Procedures: Reduction of the Administrative Burden 
 
Proposal for Change 
 
In view of difficulties faced by the LDCs in complying with the provisions of 
notification obligations, the proposed change related to inclusion of a para that calls 
for examining ‘possible improvements to the notification procedures for LDCs’. The 
additional text also talked of seeking guidance from relevant WTO bodies to advise 
on the possibility of longer timeframes, specific exemptions and simplified 
procedures for notifications and cross-notifications. The sub-committee on LDCs was 
to be entrusted with this tasks and it was to report to the General Council.  
 
Relevance of the Issue for the LDCs 
LDCs as other WTO members have to comply with certain notification 
obligations and procedures. Evidently, capacity of most of the regional LDCs to 
ensure compliance with these obligations is weak. The original text sets up the terms 
of reference for the working group which asks the group to conduct a review with the 
objective of ‘simplifying, standardising and consolidating these obligations, as well as 
improving compliance with these obligations.” LDCs were interested to attain 
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to imposition of sanctions.   
 
Comments from LDC Perspective 
The text provides for greater flexibility to LDCs by easing procedure as 
regards notification obligations. The proposal should lead to simplifications and 
relaxation of LDC notification requirements, in the form of longer time frames, 
specified exemptions and simplification which could reduce their administrative 
burden. This could prove to be helpful to Asian LDCs. However, such flexibilities 
will need to be complemented by appropriate support to comply with the obligations 
since any such derogation was likely to be time-bound.  
 
2.1.8. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the DSU Article 8.10 
 
Relevance of the Issue for the LDCs 
WTO’s distinction as multilateral organisation is that it can impose sanctions. 
This power enhances the possibilities of disputes amongst member-states. No doubt in 
view of this the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) has evolved to be an 
important institution within the WTO system. The developed countries and also many 
developing countries are making good use of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) to settle disputes and safeguard their interests. However, LDCs are not being 
able to take resort to the DSM and participate effectively in its functioning. As 
regards participation of developing countries in the DSB, data shows that during 
1995-2004, as much as 43 per cent of the complaints were brought in by the 
developing countries whilst these countries were respondents in 47 per cent of the 
cases (Hossain: 2005). It is pertinent to recall here that sanctions have been imposed 
on LDC exports. Bangladesh’s export of terry towel was subjected to Anti-Dumping 
Duty (ADD) in the USA.  However, till now LDCs have not figured either as 
complainant or as defendant (the Bangladesh lead acid battery case against India was 
resolved before going to the panel)
7.   
 
In view of Article 8:10, the followings can be highlighted as concerns of LDCs with 
respect to participation in the panel: 
  The panel process is too complex and cumbersome for the LDCs; LDCs lack 
the required capacity to fight cases against developed and developing 
members in the DSB. 
  Panel process is time consuming; in case there is a case lodged against any 
LDC firm, that firm will hardly be able to sustain a protracted dispute 
settlement procedure. 
  Panels and the Appellate Body (AB) may apply hard law criteria to soft law 
S&D provisions thereby nullifying their potential benefit. 
Thus an LDC-friendly review of the attendant provisions was perceived to be of 
interest to the LDCs.  
 
Proposal for Change 
Article 8.10 of Dispute settlement understanding referred to bringing a balance 
among panelists in the DSU through inclusion of a developing country member. 
                                                 
7 In late 2001, India imposed an ADD on Bangladesh’s export of lead acid battery. Several initiatives 
were taken, on a bilateral basis, to resolve this issue. When these bilateral negotiations failed, 
Bangladesh decided to go to the DSB in 2004.  
  23African group proposed to include at least one panelist from developing country 
member, unless the developing country members agree to waive the right. The text 




Comments from LDC Perspective 
 
The revised proposal in effect reflects the proposal submitted by the African 
group to include at least one member from the developing countries in the panel in 
case of disputes that involve developing countries. It is not clear, though, to what 
extent panel membership had actually been a problem. In a 1999 report for the South 
Centre, Hesham Youssef noted that out of 20 panels involving a developing country, 
16 included panelists from a developing country, 3 had panelists chosen by consensus, 
and only 1 had panelists chosen by the DG. (Youssef: 1999) However, making 
inclusion of a panelist from the developing countries mandatory (giving the 
developing country participant in the dispute the right of waiver) needs to be 
perceived as some progress, though effective use of the DSM by the LDCs would 
require more than the inclusion of a panelist from developing countries. 
 
2.1.9. Agreement on RoO: Recognition of Preferential RoO 
 
Relevance of the Issue for the LDCs 
All LDCs are beneficiaries of multiple GSP schemes run by developed 
countries. Asian LDCs, as the table would show, are no exception.  
 
TABLE 10: MEMBERSHIP OF RTAs AND BFTAs OF THE ASIAN LDCs 
Country  Members of RTAs  Member of Bilateral FTAs 
Bangladesh SAFTA,  Bangkok  Agreement, BCIM, BIMST-EC, 
General System of Trade Preferences among Developing 
Countries (GSTP), Protocol relating to Trade 
Negotiations among Developing Countries (PTN), D-8, 
IOR-ARC 
Bangladesh – Pakistan (P); 
Bangladesh – India (P)
1
Cambodia AFTA   
Laos PDR  Bangkok Agreement, ASEAN,   Laos-Thailand 
Nepal SAFTA,  BIMST-EC  India-Nepal 
Maldives SAFTA     
Myanmar  ASEAN, General System of Trade Preferences among 
Developing Countries (GSTP), BIMST-EC 
India-Myanmar 
Note: 1. Bangladesh is at present actively considering signing bilateral FTAs with both Pakistan and India. 
Proposals to this effect have been submitted by Pakistan and India. 
Source: Compiled from Websites of the WTO and SAARC Secretariat. 
Rules of origin are important since they establish the eligibility criteria for 
preferential market access under the GSP schemes run by the developed countries. 
They relate to the criteria used to determine the nationality of a product or a producer. 
Origin criteria applied by members of free trade area preferential trading agreement 
are known as preferential rules of origin; there is also an agreement on rules of origin 
that relate to non-preferential trade regime. There is a common declaration with 
regard to preferential rules of origin appearing in annex-Il of the agreement. In recent 
years the fact of low utilization of preferential access provided through the GSPs and 
complaints by LDCs as regards stringent rules of origin have led to a call for review 
of the RoO criteria.  
 
Proposal for Change 
Common declaration with regard to preferential rules of origin, provided in 
annex II of the agreement on RoO, was the basis for S&D clause in this respect. The 
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and administrative determinations of general application applied by any member to 
determine whether goods qualify for preferential treatment. African group put forward 
a proposal in this respect which asked for adoption of RoO designed to achieve trade 
policy objectives, particularly through generating more regional trade. Proposed 
changes appeared as an additional text to the original one and this was accepted. 
Moreover, the proposal called for increased participation in the technical committee 
on RoO, and also called for identifying TA and FA to ensure compliance with the 
RoO. 
 
Comments from LDC Perspective 
The African Group’s proposal was reflected in the revised provision. The 
proposal stipulates that developing countries and LDCs ‘shall have the right to adopt 
their own Preferential Rules of Origin’. This is indeed already allowed under the 
WTO. Theoretically, this should help to increase trade within established and also 
newly established South-South trade agreements by allowing the participating 
countries to be flexible in determining the RoO. Greater participation by DCs and 
LDCs in the Committee on RoO is also welcome. But again the concerns relate to the 
implementation of TA and FA initiatives. The Asian LDCs are members of various 
regional groups. For example, Bangladesh is a member of SAFTA, BIMSTEC, D-8, 
SAGQ, IOR etc. The revised text gives them flexibility to determine the RoOs that are 
commensurate with their developmental status. However, in actualities determination 
of RoO depend on the negotiations within the purview of the particular RTA. Whilst 
this provision gives the LDCs a moral authority to ask for differential treatment, this 
is not binding.
8 For the LDCs countries to effectively participate in the Committee on 
RoO and Council for Trade in Goods, they would require significant capacity building 
support in terms for negotiations in trade related areas.  
 
2.1.10. Decision on Measures in Favour of LDCs: Paragraph 2(v) 
 
Relevance of the Issue for the LDCs 
WTO Agreements include a Ministerial Decision on measures in favour of 
LDCs that recognise “the specific needs of the LDCs in the area of market access 
where continued preferential access remains an essential means for improving their 
trading opportunities” and reaffirms “commitment to implement fully the provisions 
concerning LDCs contained in paragraph 2 (d), 6 and 8 of the Decision of 28 
November 1979 on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and 
Fuller participation of developing Countries” (also known as the Enabling Clause).    
 
The modalities for technical assistance for the LDCs are clearly spelt out in 2 
(v). It is of limited value to the LDCs if they receive market access when they do not 
have the required supply side capacities to take advantage of these opportunities.
9 
Anticipating this, paragraph 2(v) requires that technical assistance be provided 
towards supply-side capacity building of the LDCs. However, without clearly defined 
benchmarks and criteria to assess both the quantity and quality of TA such provisions 
                                                 
8 It is true that the four LDCs in the SAARC were accorded flexibility in terms of RoO under the 
SAFTA. However, as negotiations under the SAFTA testify, LDCs actually wanted more derogation 
than what was actually negotiated. 
9 This is clearly borne by the data on GSP utilisation. Only 50 percent of LDC exports eligible for GSP 
treatment can actually enter developed country markets under preferential treatment. 
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submitted in this regard.  
 
Proposal for Change 
Decision on measures in favour of LDCs came out as an outcome of 
Ministerial Decision and Declarations adapted by the TNC on 15 December 1993. 
The need to ensure effective participation of LDCs was recognised, and, therefore, 
necessary steps were scheduled to be taken in order to improve their trading 
opportunity. Para 2(v) specially talks about TA, and strengthening and diversification 
of LDCs production and export bases. LDCs had submitted elaborate proposals to 
strengthen the WTO Decision on Measures in Favour of LDCs. LDC proposal 
included both modalities (TA through IF and JITAP) and benchmarking (e.g. level of 
resources provided by developed country, level of phasing out of export subsidy) for 
effective implementation of para 2(v). The original text only stipulated that LDCs 
shall be accorded increased TA; however, it was not identified as to which sources 
this TA was to be derived from. The proposed changes recognise the need for more 
intensive participation of IF and JITAP to enable LDCs to have greater trade capacity 
building support. Besides, the need for review of implementation and monitoring was 
also recognised in the text.            
 
Comments from LDC Perspective 
The moot issue here is the availability of additional funds. Much will depend 
on the effectiveness of the Integrated Framework initiative and also on the extent to 
which DTIS findings lead to enhanced donor support. Paragraph 2(v) is a mandatory 
provision. Here, the basic task of the LDCs is to ensure that the provision is 
implemented properly. There must be clearly defined benchmarks and criteria to 
assess the intensity and effectiveness of technical assistance. In this regard, the 
proposal put forth by the LDC group is fairly comprehensive. LDCs received only 
28.9% of total commitments for support to trade policy and regulations, 18.6% of 
commitments for support to trade development and 29% of support to Infrastructure 
(WTO/OECD: 2004).
10 Funds allocated for Trade Capacity Building (TCB) have not 
seen any significant rise in recent years (see table below) and they remain inadequate 
in comparison to the real needs of the LDCs and developing countries. The table 
below clearly shows that the funds available for trade capacity building has been 
insignificant.     
TABLE 11: CONTRIBUTION TO TCB TRUST FUNDS: 2001-2004 
(US$ Thousands) 
Year  ITC  JITAP  IF Trust Fund  WTO Trust Fund  Total 
   Total  %  Total  %  Total  %  Total  %       
2001  14002 53.00 2047 7.74  3266  12.36 7100  26.87  26416 100.0 
2002  16091 44.36 1883 5.19  5845  16.11 12452  34.33  36271 100.0 
2003  19196 42.64 1263 2.80  5979  13.28 18572  41.26  45011 100.0 
2004  18752 41.88 2480 5.53  8974  20.04 14563  32.52  44769 100.0 
Source: WTO-OECD Joint Report 2004.   
 
The third LDC Ministerial meeting in Zambia held in 2005 asks for 
“Strengthening the effectiveness of the Integrated Framework, inter alia, by a 
significant resource increase, including through other initiatives, with a view to 
                                                 
10 The total support has gone up from $ 26.4 million in 2001 to $ 44.8 million in 2004. By any measure, 
this is a paltry sum given the huge demand coming from the LDCs. 
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support diversification of LDCs’ production and export base”.
11 LDC demands in this 
area has also been clearly spelt out in the Livingstone Declaration of the LDC 
Ministers which called for “Aid for Trade” as an additional, substantial and 
predictable financial mechanism to strengthen supply-side and infrastructure capacity, 
diversification of trade, addressing adjustments challenges and costs for effective 
integration of LDCs into the international trading regime (Livingstone Declaration, 
2005). The proposal creates a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one and unless 
the trade related support is not enhanced quite substantially, both in quality-term and 
in quantity, this provision will continue to remain a ‘best endeavour’ clause. The 
much-hyped ‘development package’ of the Hong Kong Ministerial could be one way 
of addressing this concern. However, it needs to be seen how much assistance is 
actually forthcoming as part of this package in the near future. 
 
2.1.11. Agreement on Agriculture  
 
Article 15.2 of the AoA: Special and Differential Treatment 
 
Relevance of the Issue for the LDCs 
 
Agriculture is the single most important sector for majority of the LDCs in the 
region, as is evidenced by data in Table-12. For many, agriculture continues to be the 
main source of foreign exchange earnings and employment as well.  
 
TABLE 12: CONTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURE IN GDP 
Country  Contribution of Agriculture in GDP in 2004 
Cambodia    36.0 





Nepal   
f 38.7 
f= Data are based on GDP at current factor cost. 
Source:  ADB Key Indicators 2005: Labor Markets in Asia: Promoting Full, Productive, and Decent 
Employment  
 
However, the share of agricultural exports from LDCs has been declining over 
time. In view of this, many developing countries would like to see changes in the 
rules that guide agricultural production and export in developed countries. As is 
known, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) has set up a framework 
of rules and disciplines, and initiated a process of gradual reductions in protection and 
trade-distorting support in agriculture. Negotiations on agriculture are related to the 
three pillars of the AoA: (i) market access, (ii) domestic support, and (iii) export 
competition. In addition to these three pillars, negotiations are also being held in 
terms of rules relating to Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment”. In view of the 
importance of the agriculture sector, S&D provisions are of particular interest to the 
Asian LDCs.  
 
                                                 
11 LDC exports are highly concentrated. For example 75 percent of Bangladesh’s export and 91 percent 
of Cambodia’s export is in apparels. The scenario is same for other regional LDCs as well. 
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Article 15 of AoA refers to special and differential treatment which allows 
developing country members flexibility to implement reduction commitments over a 
period of up to 10 years. In the last line of the original text of Article 15.2 it was 
confirmed that LDCs need not to take any reduction commitment. Both African group 
and LDCs had put forward proposals in this respect. The proposed change again 
stressed on confirmation (by the GC) with addition of a line “unless decided 
otherwise by consensus.”        
 
Comments from LDC Perspective 
Although the LDCs are exempted from reduction commitments under the 
AoA, the addition of “unless decided by consensus” has definitely weakened the S&D 
accorded to the LDCs. It is however well know that in reality LDCs are compelled to 
undertake unilateral reductions under pressure from the international financial 
institutions, particularly World Bank and IMF. These institutions required the LDCs 
to reduce average tariff and decrease domestic support and subsidies to agriculture as 
a pre-condition of qualifying for the much-needed financial aid. Most LDCs have 
their applied tariff rates well below their bound tariff rates in the WTO. Bangladesh’s 
highest applied tariff rate for agricultural imports was 37.5 percent against the bound 
tariff rate of 200 percent in 2000/01. Actual Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) to 
agriculture in LDCs has also been low, mainly because of their financial constraint. 
Although the allowed de minimis level for AMS for Bangladesh is 10 percent of the 
total value of agricultural output, Bangladesh’s actual AMS was 0.51 percent of the 
total value of agricultural  GDP in 2001/02 (Deb, 2005).      
 
It is pertinent here to take note of the relevant part of the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Decision with regard to the issue of coherence. The decision stipulates: 
“We welcome the Director-General's actions to strengthen the WTO's cooperation 
with the IMF and the World Bank in the context of the WTO's Marrakesh mandate on 
Coherence, and invite him to continue to work closely with the General Council in 
this area. We value the General Council meetings that are held with the participation 
of the heads of the IMF and the World Bank to advance our Coherence mandate. We 
agree to continue building on that experience and expand the debate on international 
trade and development policymaking and interagency cooperation with the 
participation of relevant UN agencies. In that regard, we note the discussions taking 
place in the Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance on, inter alia, the issue of 
Coherence, and look forward to any possible recommendations it may make on steps 
that might be taken within the mandate and competence of the WTO on this issue”. 
 
However, this does not put any binding commitment on the relevant 
institutions to ensure compliance between what is decided in the WTO and what the 
LDCs are subjected to as part of conditionalities, particularly of the Bretton Woods 
institutions. In absence of a comprehensive approach to the issue of coherences such 
exemptions do not matter much to the LDCs. 
 
2.1.12. Understanding on BOP Provisions of GATT 1994 Paragraph 8 
 
Relevance of the Issue for the LDCs 
 
  28The text relates to simplification of procedures with regard to the consultation 
process as regards BoP. These concern the provision for (i) "expanded consultations" 
enabling contracting parties to identify possibilities to alleviate and correct Balance-
of-Payments problems through measures designed to "facilitate an expansion" in the 
export earnings of developing countries,  and (ii)  "simplified consultations" providing 
for a simple decision by the BOP Committee on whether full consultations are 
desirable. Since BoP concerns are critically important for LDCs, any S&D clause to 
address their attendant concerns is of interest to them. 
 
Proposal for Change 
Paragraph 8 of the understanding on the balance–of-payments (BOP) 
provisions of GATT 1994 refers to procedures for BOP consultations. The original 
text emphasised the need for simplified consultation procedure. Both African group 
and LDCs put forward their proposals in this respect. The additional text only allows 
examining different ways and means of simplifying administrative requirements. In 
the additional text, the committee on BOP Restrictions is mandated by the General 
Council to examine the consultation procedure.  
 
Comments from the LDC Perspective 
The proposal reiterates what is already in the WTO agreement regarding 
procedures relating to BOP consultations. The recommendations relate to 
‘simplification of administrative requirements’ within the full consultation 
procedures. Again there is no benchmarking and compulsion to ease the consultation 
burden of developing countries and LDCs in cases where full consultation was 
required. The revised text also does not take cognisance the demand articulated in the 
proposal submitted by the African Group which called for replacement of ‘may’ by 
‘should’ in paragraph 8. This would have made the provision LDC-friendly and more 
enforceable.  
 
2.2 Summary of the Twelve Proposals 
The preceding discussion has attempted to examine & assess the twelve 
proposals belonging to Category I (as regards which a consensus has been reached) 
from the perspective of Asian LDCs. The following table (Table-13) attempts to 
capture this discussion in a succinct manner by juxtaposing the revised text with the 
original one, and then commenting on the changes from the perspectives of the Asian 
LDCs. 
 
TABLE 13: A brief Summary of the Comments on the S&D Proposals Beloning to Category1  
Proposed S&D Clause  Original Text  Revised Text  Comments from the 
perspective of LDC 
interests 
GATS Article IV: 3: 
Special Priority to 
LDCs for ensuring 
increased participation  
Special priority shall be 
given to LDC for 
implementing Para 1 & 
2 
Requires member 
countries to inform 
how the special 




mandatory in nature 
(using ‘shall’) to 
provide information 
“Shall”, ensures binding 
nature of obligations; 
“serious difficulties” of 
LDCs has been 
recognized. However, no 
definitive obligation in 
terms of commitment for 
according special priority 
to sectors of interest to 
LDCs. 
GATS Article IV:  Increased developing  In all services  Commitment was made 
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country participation in 




access to technology, 
improvement of 




of market  
negotiations, 
modalities shall be 
developed in order to 
ensure LDCs 
participation  
to draw up modalities for 
ensuring participation of 
LDCs. However, no 
commitment on the part 
of developed countries to  
open up sectors of 
interest to LDCs. Need 
for access to technology 
recognized, but no firm 
mechanism for ensuring 
technology transfer. 




TA shall be provided 
at the multilateral level 
by the Secretariat, to 
be decided upon by 
CTS 
Inclusion of five new 
sentences. WTO 
Secretariat is 
instructed by GC to 
conclude arrangement 
with other institutions 
for providing TA to 
Developing Countries 
and LDCs. 
Need for significant 
enhancement of resource 
allocation under IF and 
strengthening supply-side 
capacities of the LDCs is 
recognised. However, 
there is no mechanism for 
enforcement. 
GATS - Paragraph 6 of 




transfer of technology 
and training in 
telecommunications 
sector 
Relates to cooperation, 
information, and 
transfer of technology 
and training in 
telecommunications 
sector. Special 
emphasis has been 
given to the LDCs 




GC instructs the CTS 
to put in place 
arrangements for 
prompt notification 
with regard to the 
measures articulated 
in the text. 
Will allow monitoring of 
the extent to which 
developed countries are 
complying with the spirit 
and content of the Annex. 
However, no concrete 
measures as to what 
happens when this is not 
there. 
TRIPS Article 67: TA 
and  Reviewing 
Agreement between 
WIPO & WTO 
Developed country 
Members shall 
provide, TA and FA in 
favour of developing 
and LDCs Members in 
the area of law 
making, enforcement 
of domestic regulatory 
measures, training of 
personnel.  
First para more or 
less repetition of 
original text.  Second 
para (new inclusion) 
mentions about 
review of conformity 
between WIPO & 
WTO. 
Reaffirmation to provide 
TA in relation to TRIPS. 
This is at best a  best 
endeavor clause, with no 
enforceability. 
ENABLING CLAUSE:  
Decision on 
Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of 
Developing Countries 
The Enabling Clause is 
called the “Decision on 
Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of 
Developing Countries” 
in WTO parlance.  
GC confirms: terms 
and conditions of the 
Enabling Clause shall 
apply when action is 
taken by Members.  
Proposal does not change 
the status quo, but may 
provide increased 
certainty to GSP 
schemes, regional trade 
agreements and other 
initiatives to foster South-






The Council for Trade 
in Goods will 
undertake a review of 
notification obligations 
and procedures under 
the Agreements in 
GC instructs the Sub-
Committee on LDCs 
to examine possible 
improvements to the 
notification 
procedures for LDCs, 
Proposal should lead to 
simplifications and 
relaxation of LDC 
notification requirements, 
in the form of longer time 
frames, exemptions etc. 
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perspective of LDC 
interests 
Annex 1A of the WTO 
Agreement. This will 
be carried out by a 
Working Group  
This was expected to lead 
to reduction of their 
administrative burden.   
DSU Article 8.10: 
Having a  panellist(s) 
from a developing 
country Member 
Inclusion of at least 
one panellist from a 
developing country 
Member when dispute 
is between a 
developing country 
Member and a 
developed country 
Member. 
GC has agreed to 
this: one panellist 
shall be from a 
developing country 
Member, unless the 
developing country 
Member party to the 
dispute waives this 
right. 
Makes the inclusion of a 
panellist from the 
developing countries 
mandatory;  should be 
perceived as a progress. 
However, presence of 
panelist(s) is not likely to 
address the problem of 
weak participation 
capacity of LDCs in the 
DSM. 
AGREEMENT ON 
RoO:   Recognition of 
Preferential RoO 
There is a common 
declaration with regard 
to preferential rules of 
origin appearing in 
annex-Il of the 
agreement. 
Members shall have 
the right to adopt 
preferential rules to 
facilitate increased 
participation of 
developing and LDCs 
in the activities of the 
Technical Committee 
on RoO of the WTO.  
Coordination in 
identifying TA and 
FA to address the 
needs of  the 
developing LDCs.  
Confirmation of 
Preferential Rules of 
Origin. Aim is to increase 
trade within established 
and new South-South 
trade. Greater 
participation by DCs and 
LDCs in the Committee 
on RoO is a welcome 
development. But again 
the concerns are with 
regard to the 
implementation of TA, 
FA initiatives.  
DECISION ON 
MEASURES IN 
FAVOUR OF LDC  
Paragraph 2(v) 
 
LDCs  shall be 
accorded substantially 
increased TA in the 
development, 
strengthening and 
diversification of their 
production and export 
bases including those 
of services, as well as 
in trade promotion 
The proposed 
changes recognize the 
need for more 
intensive 
participation of IF 
and JITAP to enable 
LDCs to have greater 
trade capacity 
building support. The 
need for review of 
implementation and 
monitoring was also 
recognized in the 
text. 
Availability of additional 
fund is the central issue 
here. Effectiveness of the 
IF initiative and also as 
regards the extent to 
which DTIS findings lead 
to enhanced donor 
support would be the real 
challenge. However, 
there is no defined 
benchmarks and criteria 
to assess the ‘intensity 






For developing country 
Members, flexibility to 
implement reduction 
commitments over a 
period of up to 10 
years; for LDCs no 
reduction 
commitments. 
GC confirms: LDCs 
to be exempt from 
reduction 
commitments, unless 
decided otherwise by 
consensus.” 
The reconfirmation is 
welcome. However,  
“Unless decided by 
consensus” has somewhat 
weakened the S&D 
accorded to the LDCs, 





GATT 1994 Paragraph 
8 
The text relates to 
simplification of 
procedures with regard 
to the consultation 
process with respect to 
BoP.  
“GC mandates the 
Committee on BoP 
Restrictions to 
examine ways and 
means of simplifying 
the administrative 
Simplification of burden 
of consultation has been 
stressed. But tells of only 
examination of ways and 
means. There is no 
benchmarking and 
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perspective of LDC 
interests 
requirements within 
the full consultation 
procedures.” 
binding obligation  to 
ease burden related to 
consultation to be 
conducted by developing 
and LDCs.  
Source: Analysis carried out in this paper 
 
In view of the above analysis, Table-14 attempts to examine possible impact 
of the twelve aforesaid proposals on the Asian LDCs. As the table bears out, many of 
the agreed proposals are unlikely to have positive impact in terms of strengthened 
global integration of the LDCs and their participation in the multilateral trading 
system. Only a few of the S&D proposals are likely to directly benefit the LDCs. 
Much will depend on other complementary measures in support of the LDCs. 
 
TABLE 14:  Brief Analysis of the 12 S&D Clause 
Category 1  Proposed by  Content  Reflection of 





GATS Article IV: 3:  LDC Group  Flexibility No  Very  modest 
impact 
GATS Article IV:  LDC Group  Flexibility  Partially  Some positive 
impact 
GATS Article XXV.2  African Group  Technical 
Assistance 
Yes Some  positive 
impact 
GATS - Paragraph 6 of the 
Annex on Telecommunications 
LDC Group  Flexibility  No  Not much impact 
TRIPS Article 67  LDC Group  Technical 
Assistance 
Partially Very  modest 
impact 
ENABLING CLAUSE  Not mentioned  Flexibility  N/A  Not much impact 
RULES RELATING TO 
NOTIFICATION 
PROCEDURES 
Not mentioned  Clarification  N/A  Some positive 
impact 
DSU Article 8.10  African Group  Clarification  Yes  Not much impact 
AGREEMENT ON RoO:  African Group  Flexibility  Yes  Some positive 
impact 
DECISION ON MEASURES 
IN FAVOUR OF LDC  
Paragraph 2(v) 
LDC Group  Technical 
Assistance 








Flexibility Yes  Insignificant 
impact 
UNDERSTANDING ON BOP 





Clarification Partially  Very  modest 
impact 
Source: Comments by authors based on the analysis carried out in this paper 
 
3 ANALYSIS OF FIVE S&D AGREEMENT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ADOPTED 
DURING THE HONG KONG WTO MINISTERIAL (ANNEX F OF THE HONG KONG WTO 
MINISTERIAL DECISION) 
During the July 2005 Committee on Trade and Development – Special Session 
(CTD-SS) negotiations, which included both informal consultations and meetings of 
the CTD-SS, delegates worked on five Agreement specific proposals for S&D which 
were submitted by the LDCs. These five proposals belonged to the group of 88 
Agreement specific proposals that were considered by the Members. These are:   
proposal 22/23 (Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations), 36 (Duty and 
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84 (Exemption from Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, or TRIMs), 
and 88 (Measure in Favour of LDCs). Of these five proposals, three belonged to 
Category I (22/23, 36 and 38) and two belonged to category III. For better 
understanding of proposal 22/23, it was referred to as proposal 23.  
 
The earlier version of proposal 23 (prior to the Hong Kong Ministerial) called 
for Members to accord "special consideration" to requests from developing and LDC 
Members for waivers from WTO obligations. However, Paraguay, Costa Rica and 
several other Latin American countries were reportedly reluctant to approve certain 
provisions of the proposal.    
 
Proposal 36 demands that WTO Member states grant binding duty-free and 
quota-free market access to LDC exports. The US delegations opposed a binding 
language on this issue. The US also suggested that bilateral agreements between 
parties would be a better option in the context of duty and quota-free market access. It 
was mentioned that it would be a challenge to gain Congressional approval for such a 
provision. Similar concerns were expressed by a number of other developed countries, 
and also some Latin American Countries which were perhaps apprehensive that such 
preferential treatment could have negative implications for their competitiveness.  
 
During the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial, the member countries once again 
reaffirmed that provisions for special and differential (S&D) treatment are an integral 
part of the WTO Agreements. Member countries took note of the work done on the 
Agreement specific proposals, especially the five LDC specific proposals, which were 
discussed in Geneva during July 2005.  The ministerial conference in Hong Kong 
adopted the decisions contained in Annex F of the Hong Kong Declaration where the 
five LDC specific agreements on S&D were included.  
 
The following section presents a brief analysis of the Hong Kong WTO 
Ministerial outcome with respective to the five Agreement specific S&D proposals on 
which a decision was taken.   
 
3.1   Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the  
GATT 1994 (Proposal 23) 
 
Prior to the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial, two proposals (22 and 23) were under 
consideration in the context of S&D negotiations – one (TN/CTD/W/3/Rev.2) was 
submitted by the African Group and the other (TN/CTD/W/4/Add.1) by the LDCs. 
After the consultation during the December 2005 General Council Meeting, the two 
proposals were harmonised since they covered same territory. The draft proposal was 
put forward by the Chairman of the General Council on November 26, 2005. After 
consultation during the Hong Kong Ministerial, the decision as regards 
‘Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the GATT 1994’ was 
adopted.  
 
Proposal for Change 
Between the two proposals (22 and 23), the LDCs group put forward proposal 
number 23, which requested for waivers for the LDCs from WTO obligations with 
  33stipulation that a decision shall be taken within 60 days, or in exceptional cases, as 
expeditiously as possible thereafter.   
 
The latest version of the proposal which was finalised prior to the Hong Kong 
WTO Ministerial put ‘shall’ and ‘should’ in brackets. The final version cleaned the 
bracket, by putting ‘shall’. However, under pressure from developed and some 
developing countries, it was added that LDCs request in this context will be 




Comment from LDC Perspective 
In view of the prevailing situation, LDCs perhaps got what they could get out of 
the Hong Kong Ministerial. From a practical sense, it is a progress that members will 
now give a decision as regards waivers in favour of LDCs in a time-bound fashion (60 
days). However, that decision could be positive or negative. The time limit can also 
be stretched ‘in exceptional circumstances’. Definition of exceptional circumstances 
is not clear, however. The additional text in the draft text (in bracket) was 
reformulated by putting in the words ‘without prejudice to other members’. Thus, this 
text is an improvement over the earlier text, but it is a waterdown version of what the 
LDCs wanted in the first place. It will also perhaps not be practical to expect that 
Members would agree to LDC requests for waivers unconditionally. Some have 
argued that this would have made WTO contract entirely voluntary and non-binding 
for the LDCs. However, the spirit of LDC proposal was to have a time-bound 
commitment for a positive decision. This has now been diluted through (a) the caveat 
of ‘exceptional circumstances, and (b) with the mention of ‘without prejudice to the 
rights of other members’.      
 
3.2  Enabling Clause (Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries) – Paragraph 
3(b) (Proposal 36) 
 
Proposal for Change 
This particular proposal, which dealt with the Duty-Free, Quota-Free (DF-QF) 
market access for all products from all LDCs, was the singlemost important issue with 
which the LDCs went to Hong Kong.  
 
Although the GSP schemes, which have been in place since 1971, covers a 
large part of LDC exports to many of the developed counties, the DF-QF initiative 
was seen by the LDCs as a major step forward in terms of supporting strengthened 
global integration of their economies. The demand for DF-QF was forcefully 
advanced by LDCs when the Doha Development Round (DDR) was launched in 
2001. Bangladesh, which by all accounts was expected to be a major beneficiary of 
such an initiative because of her relatively strong supply-side capacities compared to 
many other LDCs, argued most vigorously for the DF-QF market access during LDC 
Ministerial Meetings, WTO Ministerial Meetings and in the course of negotiations in 
Geneva over the past years.
12
                                                 
12 Both at the Zanzibar LDC Ministerial Meeting (July, 2001) and at the Dalian mini-Ministerial 
meeting (July, 2005), Bangladesh and other LDCs had made it clear that the DF-QF initiative 
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Whilst there was widespread support for DF-QF market access favouring the 
LDCs, some of the developed countries, most notably the USA, whose GSP scheme 
did not cover many of the important items of export from the LDCs, were opposed to 
an overarching DF-QF initiative. Some of the other developed countries, whilst 
having generous GSP schemes in place for the LDCs, were reluctant to bring their 
unilateral GSP initiatives under any ‘binding’ multilateral discipline. Some of the 
developed countries also argued that a number of developing countries (the so-called 
advanced developing countries, including the ‘BRICKS’ countries i.e., Brazil, Russia 
(under accession process), India, China, Korea, South Africa, should also undertake 
commitments as part of a DF-QF initiative, should there be one negotiated under the 
purview of the WTO.  
 
The Draft Ministerial Decision (Revision-2) of 26 November 2005 came up 
with three versions of the proposal. The second version talked of DF-QF access in a 
time bound fashion (the first version did not mention a date), and also called upon 
‘developing country members in a position to do so’ to provide similar treatment to 
products from the LDCs. The third version added a caveat, leaving room for 
‘Members facing difficulties to provide DF-QF market access’ to provide such access 
up to certain ‘bracketed’ percentage of products originating from LDCs with the 
additional statement that the rest of the commodities will be accorded similar 
treatment within an additional period. It was also stipulated that in providing DF-QF 
access, the developed countries will ‘take into account the impact on other developing 
countries at similar level of development’. As it would be appreciated, of all the three 
versions, the third was the least most preferred version for the LDCs. In the end, 
however, it was in light of the third version that the Hong Kong Ministerial Decision 
was taken.      
 
The final decision stipulated that ‘developed countries and developing 
countries in a position to do will provide DF-QF market access for all products 
originating from LDCs, defined at the tariff line level, by 2008 or no later than end of 
the start of the implementation period {36 a (i)}. There was a caveat that Members 
facing difficulties at the present time will provide DF-QF access for at least 97 per 
cent of products originating from LDCs, which will be incrementally included into the 
DF-QF initiative {Annex F:36 a (ii)}. USA, which was instrumental in getting this 
escape clause included in the Annex, immediately indicated that it will take recourse 
to 36 a (ii). Japan also indicated that it will not be able to give DF-QF access for 180 
line items belonging to farm product group rice, leather, fish and sugar.  
 
Relevance of the Issue for Asian LDCs 
Tariffs faced by the Asian LDCs generally tend to be high- apparels, 
agricultural, fisheries and food items, and leather are products which face tariff peaks 
in the developed country markets. Table –15 bears this out. In view of this, DF-QF 
market access was a major initiative for all Asian LDCs. Average tariffs faced by 
Bangladesh, for example, in developed country markets varied between 7.3% and 
21.7%. Although most Asian LDCs enjoyed duty-free market access in most 
                                                                                                                                            
continued to remain topmost amongst all of their demands in the context of the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Meeting. 
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crucially important to Asian LDCs for several reasons.  
 
 TABLE 15: LIKELY PREFERENCE MARGIN ENJOYED BY SELECTED AP-LDCS  
IN QUAD MARKETS 
Average Tariff (in percentages)  Country 
QUAD US EC-15  Japan  Canada 
Bangladesh 12.4  12.1  12.3  7.3  21.7 
Cambodia 13.4  4.4  4.4  4.4  4.4 
Maldives 14.9  14.6  17.6  5.8  11.9 
Myanmar 4.7  12.1  6.1  1.1  19.5 
Nepal 9.5  11.1  7.4  7.7  18.7 
 Source: Subramanian, A, (2003). 
 
In spite of the 36 (b) Article of Annex F that leaves room for less than full DF-
QF market access (at least on the part of some of the developed countries), it needs to 
be appreciated that through this Decision, for the first time, LDCs were successful in 
getting a firm commitment as regards their demand for a global DF-QF market access 
under the ambit of multilateral trading system. It is to be noted in this context that the 
GSPs are unilateral initiatives taken by developed countries under autonomous 
initiatives. On the contrary, the Hong Kong Decision now multilateralises such 
preferential treatment. The Hong Kong decision also calls for ensuring that the rules 
of origin are transparent and simple, and contribute to facilitating market access. This 
provides Bangladesh and other LDCs an opportunity to call for initiating negotiations 
in the WTO with a view to making the RoO under the DF-QF initiative more flexible 
and ‘LDC-friendly’. Since duty-free (DF) market access is now part of the WTO 
decision, it brings more predictability and transparency to preferential treatment 
received by the LDCs in the markets of GSP-providing countries. The coverage of 
DF-QF treatment is also set to enhance under this initiative. 
 
As was noted, only two developed countries, USA and Japan, have indicated 
their difficulties in granting DF-QF treatment for all LDC products at this point of 
time. However, the decision asks such countries to inform WTO the manner in which 
they would phase-out the 3 percent ‘exclusion list’.  
 
The decision also asks ‘developing countries in a position to do so’ to provide 
similar market access to LDCs (to be implemented with flexibility). Although there is 
an interpretative ambiguity as regards ‘countries in a position to do so’, the Hong 
Kong decision has opened an opportunity for greater market access for LDC products 
in the markets of some of the developing countries such as China and India. In view 
of the increasing importance of these countries in the global arena, this decision opens 
up an opportunity to put pressure on these countries to provide increased market 
access for products of export interest to LDCs such as Bangladesh.
13   
 
Comments from LDC Perspective 
As was mentioned above, DF-QF initiative is crucially important for 
Bangladesh and the LDCs, as it provides predictability and security to market access 
                                                 
13 These countries do provide preferential access to regional LDCs, on a limited scale - India under the 
SAFTA and BIMSTEC FTAs and China under the Bangkok agreement. Even when these countries 
agree to provide additional market access, it is likely that they would provide preferential treatment 
under various RTAs, and not under the WTO. 
  36in developed countries. The mention of transparency and simplicity of RoO is also 
noteworthy. However, the LDCs were disappointed and disillusioned for several 
reasons. 
 
Firstly, 36 a (ii) leaves room for developed countries for not granting such 
access, at this point of time. USA and Japan have already indicated their inability. 
Although the USA is one of the most important markets for AP-LDC export, its 
indication of resorting to 36 a (ii) was most frustrating for them. Average tariff rates 
facing AP-LDC export in the USA is quite high; major export of goods such as 
apparels do not enjoy GSP facilities in the USA. For example, as a recent study 
carried at CPD by Rahman, M and Anwar, A (2006) on “Hong Kong Ministerial 
Decision on Market Access for the LDCs (Annex F: Special & Differential Treatment; 
Article 36: Decision on Measures in Favour of LDCs): Strategies for Bangladesh” 
shows, import duties on Bangladesh’s exportable alone stood at US$ 421 million in 
FY2005. Similarly exports from Cambodia and other Asian LDCs also faced high 
tariffs in the USA. DF-QF access to US market in particular could have been the most 
important gain for the Asian LDCs. As it appears now, taking advantage of 36 a (ii), 
USA will perhaps exclude almost all products of export interest to LDCs. US has 
10265 items of import (at 8-digit tariff line). A 3 per cent exclusion list will allow 
USA to exclude almost all LDC products of export interest, particularly given the 
high concentration of LDCs exports. Bangladesh’s export structure, presented in 
Table-16, gives good cause for this apprehension. 
 
TABLE 16: BANGLADESH’S EXPORT TO USA IN 2005: CONCENTRATION PATTERN  
  
Bangladesh’s Export Coverage  
 Percentage of Tariff Lines  
Number of 
Bangladesh 
Export Lines to 
US 
Export Value 
(Mln USD)  % of Total Export 
1% of Total US Tariff Line   103  2778.20 96.43 
2% of Total US Tariff Line  205  2866.80 99.51 
3% of Total US Tariff Line  308  2878.04 99.90 
Source: CPD-TPA estimates based on USITC database. 
 
Even an exclusion of 103 items could leave out 96.4 per cent of Bangladesh’s 
export to USA. Accordingly, if the USA exclusion list for LDCs (308 items) include 
even a few items of Bangladesh’s export interest, Bangladesh’s incremental gain from 
this initiative will be minimal.  
 
Secondly, although the decision talks of incremental inclusion of the exclusion 
list items under the ambit of DF-QF initiative, there is no time line for this, neither is 
there any guideline for incremental inclusion, e.g. in the form of certain percentage of 
items in the exclusion list.   
 
Thirdly, the prospect of developing country Members declaring themselves ‘in 
a position to do so’ to provide DF-QF access is also not very promising. Eventually, 
the inclusion of the reference in the text about ‘taking into account the impact on 
other developing countries in similar levels of development’ has diluted the entire 
thrust of the provision. Any developed country which is reluctant to provide DF-QF 
access can now say, they would have given market access for all LDC products but 
since this may prove to be harmful to interests of particular countries (in Hong Kong, 
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give DF-QF market access for all products originating from LDCs. 
 
Fourthly, and this is very important for Asian LDCs, there is the issue of 
preference erosion. The preferences enjoyed by the LDCs under GSP schemes, or 
under the proposed DF-QF initiative in Annex F of Hong Kong Decision, are likely to 
be eroding fast in view of the ongoing negotiations in Agriculture and NAMA. Thus, 
if the LDCs do not receive DF-QF access now, the significance of this will be far less 
five years from now when the MFN tariffs are scheduled to be reduced significantly. 
Since reduction of tariff will be steeper for higher tariffs (tariff peaks), whatever be 
the coefficient in the Swiss formula, the erosion of preference will be significant for 
many AP-LDCs such as Bangladesh and Cambodia. For Bangladesh, the preference 
currently enjoyed under the various GSPs would come down significantly, 
particularly under the EU-EBA and the Canadian GSP. The resultant erosion of 
preference for Bangladesh is estimated to be to the tune of $200-$300 million. 
(Rahman, M and Shadat W, 2005). A recent paper by Low et al. (2005) points out, 
rightly, that preference erosion will be significant for some particular LDCs 
(including Bangladesh) and will not be significant for others. This is a valid 
observation. However, it should be borne in mind that the low levels of preference 
erosion are also due to low preference utilisation under the various GSPs. The Hong 
Kong Ministerial Decision also mentions about ensuring that ‘preferential rules of 
origin applicable to imports from LDCs are transparent and simple and contribute to 
facilitating market access.’  If this be really the case, the utilisation would be higher 
and the prospect of preference erosion is also likely to be greater in view of tariff 
reduction. However, the point made by Low et all (2005) is that the margin of erosion 
is likely to be highly differentiated and, in view of this, the compensatory measures 
should be designed to address specific cases. This is a valid argument.  
 
As was pointed out above, there is a high degree of frustration in LDCs such 
as Bangladesh, because of the way this particular proposal has been articulated. The 
Chair, in this context, had mentioned in his concluding speech, that Annex F is a 
framework and that manner in which this decision will be implemented will be 
decided through subsequent negotiations. A timeline has now been fixed for this: 
developed countries to notify by September, 2006; and developing countries in a 
position to do so to notify by December, 2006.  
 
LDCs will now need to do their homework as regards the negotiations in the 
context of the framework. Their interest is to have as many of the developed countries 
as is possible to agree to 36 a (i) which stipulates DF-QF for all LDCs products. As 
regard developed countries which would take advantage of 36 a (ii), LDC position 
would be to have as many of their products of export interest included in the ‘at least 
97 per cent DF-QF list’. Here, the LDCs must strategise, as a group and on individual 
basis. One of the disquieting points for LDCs is the mention in the Hong Kong 
decision about taking cognisance of possible (negative) impact on other developing 
countries at similar levels of development. Here the point should be that if negative 
impact of the DF-QF initiative for developing countries is to be considered, LDCs 
also could agree that developed countries should liberalise at a slower pace since 
faster pace of liberalisation could also lead to preference erosion for the LDCs. 
Surely, the developing countries will not accept this line of argument. Besides, LDCs 
should argue that developing countries at ‘similar level of development’ is an 
  38ambiguous category. ‘Developing countries at similar levels of development’ could 
only be other LDCs. In fine, LDCs should pursue coordinated strategy in Geneva to 
ensure that they are able to extract maximum benefit from Annex F of proposal 36.  
 
It is also not clear how the possible impact on developing countries will be 
assessed. LDCs should argue that this can not be assessed a-priori and that developed 
countries’ decision on DF-QF initiative must not be influenced by any a-priori 
consideration. DF-QF access must first be provided, and then if there is any 
consequent negative impact on developing countries exports, this should be taken 
cognisance of and addressed through appropriate measures (such measures may not 
necessarily be through denying the LDCs the benefits of DF-QF market access) for 
those line items, but could be through other means as well.
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3.3  Enabling Clause (Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries) (Proposal-38) 
 
Proposal for Change 
The objective of this submission (proposal number 38) was to strengthen an 
enabling clause (TN/CTD/W/4/Add.1). The proposal was submitted by the LDCs. 
The proposal reaffirmed that LDCs would be required to ‘undertake commitments and 
concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial or 
trade needs, and their administrative and institutional capacities.’ The proposal also 
reiterates the need for coherence with other international institutions. The Hong Kong 
WTO Ministerial declaration reflected, to some extent, the LDC demand as 
articulated in the proposal.  
 
Relevance for Asian LDCs 
The S&D proposal is of heightened interest to all LDCs including the AP-
LDCs in view of their limited institutional and administrative capacities. The need for 
ensuring consistency between obligations under the various WTO Agreements and the 
state of economic development and financial and trade needs of the LDCs is of 
paramount interest to the LDCs. In this context, LDCs have always argued for 
establishment of ‘coherence’ between WTO decisions, and the conditionalities 
imposed by the international institutions which often undermine the flexibilities 
provided to the LDCs in the WTO. For example under the NAMA and Agricultural 
negotiations, LDCs are not required to reduce their tariffs under WTO provisions. 
However, most Asian LDCs have already reduced their tariffs, to a substantial extent, 
under conditionalities of the various structural adjustment credit programmes. From 
the above perspective, for the Asian LDCs, this proposal had high relevance.  
 
 
Comments from LDC Perspective 
One of the overarching objectives of the WTO is to make trade work for 
economic development. The Doha round has this objective at the centre of its broad 
range of agendas and work programmes.  Reduced levels of obligation and promise of 
TA and FA support for the LDCs are two ways that members have agreed to pursue in 
order to achieve the aforesaid overarching goals. However, most LDCs find it difficult 
                                                 
14 For example, trade related capacity building support to these developing countries or according 
preferential market access for those particular line items originating from the affected countries. 
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the required resources and expertise, or such obligations clash with their strategic 
interests. The aim of this particular proposal is to provide flexibility to the LDCs in 
terms of taking commitments. It requires them to do so to the extent that is consistent 
with their individual development, financial or trade needs. This derogation, if it can 
be realised on the ground, could be helpful to the LDCs. A fair and faithful 
implementation of this S&D provision would require a major departure from the 
current practices of organisations such as IMF and the World Bank. However, the 
reality is that most of the Asian LDCs have to implement reforms under aid-
conditionalities of Bretton Woods Institutions and the waivers in the WTO have not 
meant much to the LDCs, at least not till now. The Hong Kong decision calls upon 
donors, multilateral agencies and international financial institutions to coordinate their 
work to ensure that their conditionalities are not inconsistent with LDCs ‘rights and 
obligations under the WTO Agreement’. However, this is just a ‘call’ and there is no 
enforceability to such calls. Everything will depend on the goodwill of these 
institutions to craft their policies in a manner that conforms with the spirit of this 
S&D provision. Concrete modalities should now be identified to implement this 
provision. For example, LDCs could be asked to report to the WTO which of the 
conditionalities of other (than the WTO) multilateral institutions they find difficult to 
implement. The next step could be to examine whether LDCs have received 
derogation in WTO from implementing any (or all) of these policies/reforms. The 
third step could then be to identify ways and means to take care of the LDC concerns 
by bringing the necessary changes in the practices of those organsiations. 
 
3.4 Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS): (Proposal 84:  Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures)  
 
Proposal for Change 
LDCs original proposal refers to a time period during which they would be 
allowed to deviate from their obligations under the TRIMS. Additionally, LDCs also 
wanted flexibility to adopt new measures to deviate from their obligations under the 
TRIMS Agreement. Prior to the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial, the General Council 
articulated a revised proposal, whereby LDCs would (shall) be allowed to maintain, 
on a temporary basis, existing measures that deviate from their obligations under the 
TRIMS Agreement. The Hong Kong declaration allowed LDCs this deviation until 
the end of a new transition period, for seven years. LDCs were also allowed to 
introduce new measures that deviate from their TRIMS obligations. However, it was 
decided that ‘any (new) measures incompatible with TRIMS agreement and adopted 
under this decision shall be phased out by year 2020’.   
 
Relevance for Asian LDCs 
Most LDCs find it difficult to implement TRIMS obligations and they were 
interested to have extension of the timeline for this. The difficulties arose from their 
lack of capacity to implement, as also from their need to provide preferential 
treatment to their own investors (i.e., deny national treatment to foreign investors). 
Position of Asian LDCs in this context is informed by three considerations: Firstly, 
they lacked appropriate capacity to implement the obligations; secondly, they wanted 
to defer implementation of some of the obligations; and thirdly, they wanted the 
power to implement new measures to safeguard their concerns and interests as regards 
trade related investment measures.    
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Comments from LDC Perspective 
The provision provides flexibility in terms of both implementation of obligated 
measures and introduction of new measures. Bangladesh and other LDCs will now be 
able to take new investment-related measures that deviate from TRIMS obligations. 
This is a positive achievement and gives LDCs considerable flexibility. The LDCs 
have also been accorded an extension as regards TRIMS for another seven years, i.e. 
till 2013. LDCs will now be able to continue with the old TRIMS, subject to 
notification. Asian LDCs will be able to introduce new investment measures as well 
to be phased out by 2020. These waivers and flexibilities should allow LDCs to take 
measures in support of domestic investors and apply discretionary measures in their 
support. However, it is doubtful to what extent the Asian LDCs, many of which are 
under Bank-Fund conditionalities, will be able to take advantage of these waivers. 
Here again, the issue of coherence looms large. 
   
3.5   Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries: (Proposal 88: 
Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries–Paragraph 1) 
 
Proposal for Change 
Original para 1 of the decision on measures in favour of LDCs stipulated that 
LDCs were required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent 
consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs. Proposal 
submitted by the LDCs (TN/CTD/W/3/Rev.2) urged members to provide further TA 
and FA to enable them to meet their obligations and commitments in the WTO. ‘Aid 
for Trade’ facility was mentioned in this respect. It was argued that the size of the 
funds should be sufficient to enable the LDCs to comply with new commitments and 
also attendant costs (for example emanating from preference erosion). General 
Council decision of 2005 articulated two alternative proposals. The first one stipulated 
that LDCs shall be required to undertake commitments that were consistent with their 
individual development and trade needs. GC agreed that for fulfilment of these 
commitments, LDCs would require appropriate levels of TA and FA.  The second 
proposal called upon the GC to consider any difficulties that LDCs may face when 
these were brought to GC’s notice. The proposal directs WTO to ‘coordinate’ its 
efforts with donors and relevant agencies to ‘significantly increase aid for trade-
related technical assistance and capacity building.’     
 
Relevance for Asian LDCs 
This proposal is relevant for Asian LDCs since it reiterates the need for 
according flexibilities to the LDCs in undertaking commitments. The provision asks 
LDCs to bring to the attention of the GC any difficulty they may face and promises 
‘examination and appropriate action’. The proposal also addresses a key demand of 
Asian LDCs which relates to TA and FA needs for meeting the obligations. ‘Aid for 
Trade’ was a major slogan of all Asian LDCs in the Hong Kong and this proposal, by 
instructing the WTO to explore for additional funds in support of the LDCs addresses 
this concern.    
 
Comments from LDC Perspective 
This proposal reiterates LDCs demand for waivers from obligations on the one 
hand, and more support in the form of ’aid for trade’ on the other. From this 
perspective, the proposal could be a step forward to implement the “development 
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relevant agencies’ to significantly increase aid for Trade Related Technical Assistance 
(TRTA) and Capacity Building (CB). However, the proposal does not have a target: 
‘significantly increase’ is a vague term that is devoid of any reference points. The 
proposal would have been much more meaningful if there was a provision for 
reporting back to the GC as regards WTO’s success in carrying out this direction.     
 
3.6   Summary of the Five Agreement specific S&D Proposals Adopted During the 
Hong Kong WTO Ministerial 
The discussion above has attempted to present an analysis of the five proposals 
on which decision was reached in Hong Kong. The fact that members decided to deal 
with LDC-specific proposals on a priority basis must be seen as a step forward and in 
the right direction since it is this particular sub-strata of countries among the 
developing country members of the WTO which is facing more hardship in their 
effort to integrate successfully with the global market and in undertaking 
commitments in the WTO. However, as the analyses have shown, the Hong Kong 
decision failed to meet LDCs expectations fully. Besides, large part of whatever has 
been achieved will hinge on other complementary and supportive follow up measures. 
 
Based on the above discussion, Table-17 below presents a brief summary of 
these five Agreement specific proposals adopted during the Hong King WTO 




TABLE 17: Summary of the Five Agreement Specific S&D Proposals Adopted During the Hong 













1)  Proposal 23: 
Understanding in 
respect of waivers 
of obligations 
under the GATT 
1994 
 
We agree that requests 
for waivers by LDCs 
shall be given positive 
consideration and 
decision taken within 60 
days.  
Introduction of 
“shall/should” term in 
bracket before the word 
“positive 
consideration”. A new 





countries agreed to take 
decision within 60 
days, [taking into 




adopted the word: 
shall” and used the 
line “without 
prejudice to the 
rights of other 
members”  
Decisions on waivers for 
LDCs have been made 
time-bound. However, 
reference to rights of 
other members may raise 
difficulties during 
implementation.     
2). Proposal 36: 
Decision on measures in 
favour of LDCs 
Developed country 
members “shall’ commit 
themselves to provide 
DFQF market access for 
Three alternative 
proposals were placed. 
First alternative 
stipulates that DFQF 
MA for all LDCs 
products shall be 
provided by developed 
Hong Kong text 
essentially adopted 
the third variant of 
the draft. Whilst 
the proposal talked 
about DF-QF 
market access for 
For the first time LDCs 
will get DF-QF market 
access under WTO 
discipline, which is very 
important. However, 
meaning of ‘on a lasting 
basis’ is not clear. Leaves 
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Proposal 










Developing country who 
are in a position to do so 
‘should’ provide DFQF 
access. Members shall 
notify GC at least once 
in a year. GC urges all 
donors for TA and FA 
for fulfilling SPS & TBT 
requirement and 
managing their 
adjustment process.  
countries (use shall), 
developing countries in 
a position to do so by a 
bracketed year are also 
to provide similar 
access. Besides urged 
to ensure that 
preferential RoO are 
simple and transparent. 
Regarding the FA and 
TA, the earlier text 
submitted by LDCs 
remained same. Second 




themselves in a 
position to do so, shall 
build on commitment 
for DFQF MA for 
products coverage (not 
mentioned). Other 
issue remained same. 
Only Asked for TA for 
adjustment process 
resulting from MFN 
liberalisation. Third 
alternative, The text 
called for DF-QF 
market access for a 
certain percentage of 
LDC products [99%]. 
All the three proposals 
mentioned about 
flexible RoO and TA 
and FA support for 
LDCs. 
LDC products on a 
‘lasting basis’, 36 
a (ii) allows 
developed 
countries to 
provide access to 
97% of LDC 
products.  ‘Taking 
into account the 
impact on other 
developing 




text also pointed 
out about 
simplified rules of 
origin, and TA and 
FA support for the 
LDCs.  
scope for developed 
countries not to provide 
DF-QF market access for 
up to 3 per cent of LDCs 
products. The possibility 
of greater market access 
in USA (which does not 
provide GSP for many 
products of export interest 
to Asian LDC) remaining 
severely constrained in 
terms of coverage of 
exported value. The 
introduction of additional 
text referring to 
consideration of interest 
of other developing 
countries along with the 
allowance of (upto to) 3 
per cent exclusion list will 
allow developed members 
not to provide DF-QF to 
all products from LDCs if 
they so desire. The chair 
has mentioned in 
concluding speech that 
Annex F is a framework. 
Developed (and 
developing) countries will 
need to sit with LDCs to 
detail out the manner in 
which the DF-QF 
initiative will be 
implemented.    











LDCs will undertake 
commitments consistent 
with their individual 
financial, trade and other 
needs. Coherence with 
Revision -2 put 
forward the same 
proposal that LDC 
submitted. It was 
reaffirmed that LDCs 
will only be required to 
undertake obligations 
consistent with their 
capacity and needs.   
The Hong Kong 
Decision on this is 
similar to the 
revision-2 of the 
General Council 
decision.  
The reaffirmation of 
WTO decision that LDCs 
will undertake obligations 
to the extent these are 
commensurate with their 
capacity and needs, is a 
positive step. However, it 
is not clear whether 
urging donors and other 
agencies to ensure 
‘coherence’ is going to 
work on the ground.  No 
concrete modality or 
proposal has been placed 
in support of this 
provision. 
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institutions was also 
mentioned.  





For a period of [25] 
years from the signing of 
this agreement, LDCs 
shall be allowed to 
maintain existing 
measures that deviate 
from their obligations 
under the TRIMs 
Agreement. 
Additionally, LDCs may 
adopt new measures that 
deviate from their 
obligations under the 
TRIMs Agreement. All 
TRIMs should be phased 
out as soon as the 
member concerned 
attains its development 
goals.  
The possible extension 
of the above provisions 
will be reviewed by the 
General Council in [25] 
years. 
 
LDCs shall be allowed 
to maintain, on a 
temporary basis, 
existing measures that 
deviate from their 
obligations under the 
TRIMs Agreement.  
For this purpose, LDCs 
shall notify the CTG of 
such measures within 
one year, starting [x]. 
This transition period 
may be extended by the 
CTG under the existing 
procedures set-out in 
the TRIMs Agreement, 
taking into account the 
individual financial, 
trade needs. new 
TRIMs shall be 
notified to the CTG no 
later than [x] months 
[after] [prior to] their 
adoption.  
The Hong Kong 
decision is similar 
to what appeared 
in Revision -2. 
LDCs shall be 
allowed to 
maintain, on a 
temporary basis 
existing measures 
that deviate from 
their obligations 
under the TRIMs 
Agreement.  For 
this purpose, 
LDCs shall notify 
the Council for 
Trade in Goods 
(CTG) of such 
measures within 
two years, starting 
30 days after the 
date of this 
declaration.  LDCs 
will be allowed to 
maintain these 
existing measures 
until the end of a 
new transition 
period, lasting 
seven years.  The 
duration of these 
measures will not 
exceed five years, 
renewable subject 
to review and 






adopted under this 
decision shall be 
phased out by year 
2020. 
LDCs have been also 
accorded an extension 
regarding Trade-related 
Investment Measures 
(TRIMS) for another 
seven years, i.e. till 2013. 
LDCs will be able now 
not only to continue with 
old TRIMS (subject to 
notification), but also 
introduce new one. 
However, the 
apprehension is that the 
LDCs are not being able 
to use many of these 
TRIMS due to 
conditionalities under 
Bank-Fund Credit 
programme.  No concrete 
modality was suggested 
to ensure coherence in 
this context. 
5)  Proposal: 88: 
Decision on 




proposals were put 
forward:  
The first proposal 
stated that LDCs shall 
The second 
proposal was 
adopted with a 
modification: the 
word ‘may 
require’ FA, TA, 
The proposal stipulated 
that when LDCs face 
difficulty in implementing 
WTO agreements, they 
can seek a waiver. In 
addition, LDCs could 
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The General Council 
agrees that the 
implementation by 
LDCs of their 
obligations or 
commitments may 
require further technical 
and financial support 
directly related to the 
nature and scope of such 
obligations or 
commitments, and urges 
donors and relevant 
agencies to coordinate 
their efforts in the 
delivery of such support.  
Such support should also 
be available to address 
the costs of preference 
erosion. 
LDCs believe that an 
‘Aid for Trade’ facility 
needs to be developed. 
Its size should be 
adequate to meet explicit 
needs for assistance to 
enable LDCs to comply 
with new commitments 
in the context of current 
round of negotiations. 
LDCs also think that 
there should be support 
in place to bear the 
attendant costs, such as 
in view of the envisaged 
preference erosion. 
only be required to 
comply with 
obligations which were 
consistent with their 
individual 
development, financial 
or trade needs. GC 
agreed that FA and TA 
would be needed to 
fulfill this obligation.  
The second proposal 
stated that should an 
LDC Member find that 
it is not in a position to 
comply with an 
obligation or 
commitment because 
of lack of adequate 
capacity, it should 
bring the matter to the 
attention of the General 
Council for 
examination and 
appropriate action. GC 
agreed that LDCs may 
require TA, FA for 
implementing 
obligations.  
was replaced by 
the  words, “will 
require”  
seek financial assistance 
for implementing such 
agreements. However, the 
proposal is of best 
endeavour nature. The 
proposal mentions about 
significant increase in TA 
and FA for the LDCs. 
However, there is no 
reference point for this 
increase; neither is there 
any mention about 
reporting back to the GC 
about WTO’s success or 
failure in this regard.   
Source: Analysis carried out in this paper. 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The paper has analysed twelve Category I S&D proposals for which the 
likelihood of a decision is high. In view of the Hong Kong Ministerial Decision on 
S&D for the LDCs (Annex-F), the paper also analysed the five proposals on which a 
consensus was reached in Hong Kong in December 2005. In conducting the 
assessment of the aforesaid proposals, the paper has considered the perspective of the 
six LDCs that belonged to South and South-East Asia (Asian LDCs) as the reference 
point. The importance of this exercise for the Asian LDCs lies in the fact that these 
countries are being increasingly integrated into the global economy and in view of 
this the S&D proposals need to be evaluated from the perspective of their capacity to 
further facilitate the global integration of LDCs. The assessment of the 
  45aforementioned proposals was made by taking into cognisance four interconnected 
perspectives: (a) relevance of the proposals with regard to LDC interests and 
concerns; (b) extent to which proposals submitted by various developing and LDC 
members differed from the text that was agreed in the course of negotiations; (c) 
extent to which proposals on which consensus was reached in Hong Kong differed 
from LDC texts; and (d) the nature of implications of the agreed proposals from the 
vantage point of the LDCs.  
 
The paper highlights the interest of LDCs in terms of (a) market access, (b) 
waivers from obligations, and (c) implementational flexibilities. It also showed that 
the LDCs had both offensive and defensive interests with respect to the two sets of 
proposals considered. The analyses bear out that some of the proposals were of 
critical importance to the Asian LDCs. These include enhanced market access, 
waivers from undertaking obligations, deferred implementation of obligations, and 
strengthening of supply-side capacities.  
 
The DF-QF market access related proposal was perhaps the singlemost 
important S&D proposal from LDCs perspective since it was a longstanding demand 
of all LDCs which was also supported by a majority of developing and developed 
members of the WTO. In the end, LDCs were only partially successful in achieving 
their target. The paper has pointed out that the absence of any time line for phasing 
out the ‘exclusion list’ is a major weakness of the agreed text. In subsequent 
negotiations, LDCs should try to extract a time line in this regard. Implementation of 
some of the studied proposals, including the one relating to market access, were 
weakened because of reference to possible negative effect on other developing 
countries. 
 
The analysis has also brought out the importance of ensuring coherence and 
the need for adequate trade related TA and FA to facilitate capacity of the LDCs to 
take advantage of particular S&D proposals. Interpretative ambiguities associated 
with some of the agreed proposals are likely to weaken their implementation (e.g., 
wordings such as ‘lasting basis’ may be subjected to various interpretations in the 
course of subsequent discussion; impact on ‘other developing countries in similar 
situation’ in the DF-QF proposal could raise a lot of confusion and conflicting 
situation). In many cases the proposals sought to strengthen the relevant enabling 
clause by putting the word ‘shall’, and calling upon members to provide trade-related 
technical assistance and financial assistance in support of the LDCs. However, there is 
no concrete modality, reference point and/or enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
greater flow of TA or FA.  
 
It was also pointed out in the analysis that coherence was becoming a major 
issue in the discussions on S&D at the WTO. Many of the S&D related provisions 
favouring the LDCs, agreed or under consideration by the WTO, will not matter much 
to the potential beneficiary countries unless other multilateral institutions and 
financial organisations do not craft their behaviour and tailor their policies; 
accordingly. Most of these S&D provisions can hardly be implemented, without 
major inflow of resources as part of the much hyped ‘Development Package’. Even 
when waivers are given to LDCs, these would not result in any significant practical 
benefit unless parallel initiatives, in the form of coherence assurance and FA/TA 
support, are not forthcoming. 
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among LDCs, resulting in some LDCs receiving S&D, and others not. In this context, 
it needs to be kept in mind that implementation of S&D proposals are country-
specific: from the donor (developed country) side as well as the recipient (LDC) side. 
For example, the DF-QF is an initiative for all the LDCs; however, capacity to enjoy 
the potential benefits will vary from LDC to LDC according to their supply-side 
capacity. The major focus of the WTO should be to strengthen the capacity of LDCs 
to enjoy commercially meaningful market access, rather than making differentiation 
amongst the LDCs.  
 
In case, if there is an initiative addressing the issue of preference erosion, for 
obvious reasons, implementation of such an initiative will be country-specific. For 
some countries (such as Bangladesh), tariff preference erosion is a major problem, 
whilst for others, it is not. For valid reasons, the measures and support will vary 
across LDCs. There may be a strong case for situational analysis with respect to the 
non-LDC developing countries. The introduction of word such as ‘advanced 
developing countries’ or ‘developing countries in a position to do so’ in some way is a 
recognition of this. However, given the dire economic condition in which LDCs find 
themselves without exclusion (which in the first place led to identification of this 
particular sub-strata among the developing countries), it is apprehended that such 
differentiation may lead to further confusion, and distraction from the real task at 
hand.  
 
Indeed, the real task at hand is to help this sub-strata among the developing 
countries achieve the objectives of their respective poverty reduction strategies (as 
articulated in their PRSPs) and their Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through 
the help of the international trading system. Once these are accepted as the overriding 
principles which should guide the functioning of the multilateral trading system, 
approach to the S&D provisions in the WTO will be significantly different than it is 
now. 
 
As it was pointed out in this paper, till now consensus could be reached as 
regards  only five of the 88 proposals under consideration in the WTO. A decision 
could not be reached even with regard to the twelve proposals on which an agreement 
had been reached ‘in principle’ during earlier negotiations in Geneva. The discussion 
in the paper has shown that many of these proposals have some utility and economic 
significance for the Asian LDCs and that much can be achieved from these proposals 
if other parallel and complementary initiatives are also put in place. LDCs will need 
to project a common front in the ongoing negotiations in Geneva to ensure that LDC 
specific proposals get highest priority, and a decision is reached as regards the 
remaining proposals by taking into cognisance concerns and interests of the LDCs. 
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